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The New Investor
Tom C.W. Lin
AbsTrAcT
A sea change is happening in finance.  Machines appear to be on the rise and humans on 
the decline.  Human endeavors have become unmanned endeavors.  Human thought and 
human deliberation have been replaced by computerized analysis and mathematical models. 
Technological advances have made finance faster, larger, more global, more interconnected, 
and less human.  Modern finance is becoming an industry in which the main players are 
no longer entirely human.  Instead, the key players are now cyborgs: part machine, part 
human.  Modern finance is transforming into what this Article calls cyborg finance.
This Article offers one of the first broad, descriptive, and normative examinations of this 
sea change and its wide-ranging effects on law, society, and finance.  The Article begins 
by placing the rise of artificial intelligence and computerization in finance within a larger 
social context.  Next, it explores the evolution and birth of a new investor paradigm in law 
precipitated by that rise.  This Article then identifies and addresses regulatory dangers, 
challenges, and consequences tied to the increasing reliance on artificial intelligence and 
computers.  Specifically, it warns of emerging financial threats in cyberspace, examines 
new systemic risks linked to speed and connectivity, studies law’s capacity to govern this 
evolving financial landscape, and explores the growing resource asymmetries in finance. 
Finally, drawing on themes from the legal discourse about the choice between rules and 
standards, this Article closes with a defense of humans in an uncertain financial world in 
which machines continue to rise, and it asserts that smarter humans working with smart 
machines possess the key to better returns and better futures.
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INTRODUCTION 
The end is near for the human investor.1  Computers have changed ev-
erything. 
In May 2010, the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost one thousand points in 
a matter of minutes, destroying nearly $1 trillion in market value for no apparent 
reason.2  After months of investigation, the culprit turned out to be automated 
computer programs.3 
One of the most important developments of the past century is the growing 
and pervasive presence of computers in modern life.  The first computer was in-
vented in 1941.4  In 1946, it acquired electronic memory and software.5  In 1950, 
the first commercially produced computer was built.6  In 1952, computers predict-
ed the presidential election.7  By 1969, they were common in corporate America.8  
In 1983, the computer was named Time magazine’s “Machine of the Year” in lieu 
of a “Person of the Year.”9  By 1991, it connected the world through the inter-
net.10  In 1997, the computer became world chess champion.11  By 2003, the com-
puter became a part of a majority of American homes.12  And in 2011, it became 
  
1. The human investor has long been the main character of modern financial regulation.  See, e.g., H.R. 
REP. NO. 73-1383, pt. 2, at 5 (1934) (focusing on investor protection during the enactment of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934); H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, pt. 1, at 2 (1933) (emphasizing the pro-
tection of investors as the purpose of the Securities Act of 1933); Ralph K. Winter, On “Protecting the 
Ordinary Investor,” 63 WASH. L. REV. 881, 882–83 (1988) (noting that safeguarding investors is a 
primary goal of securities regulation). 
2. Graham Bowley, Dow Falls 1,000, Then Rebounds, Shaking Market, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2010, at A1. 
3. Graham Bowley, Lone Sale of $4.1 Billion in Contracts Led to ‘Flash Crash’ in May, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
2, 2010, at B1. 
4. See DIANA H. HOOK & JEREMY M. NORMAN, ORIGINS OF CYBERSPACE: A LIBRARY ON THE 
HISTORY OF COMPUTING, NETWORKING, AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS 78 (2002). 
5. See id. at 85–86. 
6. Norman E. Fry, Univac, in HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE 1940S, at 390 (James G. Ryan & 
Leonard Schlup eds., 2006). 
7. CARL REYNOLDS & PAUL TYMANN, SCHAUM’S OUTLINE OF PRINCIPLES OF COMPUTER 
SCIENCE 11 (2008). 
8. PAUL E. CERUZZI, A HISTORY OF MODERN COMPUTING 110 (2d ed. 2003). 
9. Time typically chooses a “Person of the Year,” but in 1983 the distinction was granted to a machine 
for the first time.  See Otto Friedrich, The Computer Moves In, TIME, Jan. 3, 1983, at 14. 
10. The World Wide Web debuted on December 25, 1990.  See STEPHANIE SAMMARTINO 
MCPHERSON, USA TODAY, TIM BERNERS-LEE: INVENTOR OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB 5 
(2010). 
11. FENG-HSIUNG HSU, BEHIND DEEP BLUE: BUILDING THE COMPUTER THAT DEFEATED 
THE WORLD CHESS CHAMPION, at ix (2002). 
12. See S. CRAIG WATKINS, THE YOUNG AND THE DIGITAL: WHAT THE MIGRATION TO SOCIAL-
NETWORK SITES, GAMES, AND ANYTIME, ANYWHERE MEDIA MEANS FOR OUR FUTURE 3 
(2009). 
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Jeopardy! champion.13  Now, it is an inextricable, existential part of modern life and 
business. 
Computers have changed our world in profound and prosaic ways.  This 
change is especially consequential and pronounced in finance.14  Computer tech-
nology has made finance faster, larger, more global, and more interconnected in 
form and function.15  An industry once monopolized by humans has evolved into an 
industry in which machines play a larger and more influential role.  Modern finance 
is a stage on which the main players are no longer entirely human.16  Instead, they 
are cyborgs: part machine, part human.  Modern finance is transforming into what 
this Article calls “cyborg finance,” or “cy-fi.”  This sea change is ongoing, incomplete, 
and without a final judgment on its normative impact and consequences. 
This Article offers one of the first broad, descriptive, and normative exam-
inations of this transformation and its wide-ranging effects on law, society, and 
finance.  The aim of this Article is twofold: First, it strives to capture a descriptive 
snapshot of the changing landscape in finance that is a result of the rise of artificial 
intelligence and computerization.  Second, building on that picture, this Article 
aims to identify and address the larger normative consequences for law, society, and 
finance.  Undoubtedly, such an attempt to capture and forecast the story of the 
constantly evolving modern financial landscape will be incomplete, dated, and 
tentative.17  Yet, it must be told and studied, for its transformative effects have 
grown too large and too important to ignore.  
This Article narrates this story and study in five parts.  Part I sets the stage.  
It places the ongoing financial sea change within a larger social context in which 
  
13. John Markoff, Computer Wins on ‘Jeopardy!’: Trivial, It’s Not, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2011, at A1. 
14. See Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., The Race to Zero, Speech at the 
International Economic Association Sixteenth World Congress, Beijing, China 3 (July 8, 2011), 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2011/speech509.pdf (discussing transfor-
mational changes in financial markets over the last century). 
15. As indicia of modern finance’s global nature, the U.S. Supreme Court recently opined on a securities 
case involving Australian securities purchased abroad and litigated under federal law.  See Morrison 
v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010); see also Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, 
Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 
903, 905–07 (1998) (noting that the “internationalization of capital markets continues at a dramatic 
pace” as a result of technology); Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who 
Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498, 2501–03 (1997). 
16. See Shirley J. Ho & Sushanta K. Mallick, The Impact of Information Technology on the Banking 
Industry: Theory and Empirics 2 (Nov. 7, 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (describing the prominent 
role of computers in modern banking). 
17. Charles Reich concedes a similar sentiment in his commentary of the then-transforming and 
transformative role of government on property, wealth, and individualism.  See Charles A. Reich, 
The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733 (1964) (“Inevitably, such an effort must be incomplete 
and tentative.  But it is long past time that we began looking at the transformation taking place 
around us.”). 
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machines are playing greater and more critical roles.  Part I describes how the ascent 
of machines has changed the way we live, love, work, and play.  It then describes 
how that ascension has also transformed modern finance into cyborg finance—a 
faster, larger, more global, more interconnected, and less human industry.18 
Part II introduces a protagonist.  It examines how changes in finance have 
transformed prevailing understandings of financial regulation’s main character, 
“the investor,” and how law must better account for this metamorphosis.  Part II 
begins with a discussion about the conceptual evolution of the investor from “the 
reasonable investor” to “the irrational investor” to “the new investor.”  Part II then 
presents a dossier of “the new investor,” highlights characteristics that make it dis-
tinct from previous paradigms, and alludes to the hope possessed by “the new in-
vestor.” 
Part III injects danger into the framework.  It warns of perils created and 
mutated by cyborg finance.  Part III recounts the Flash Crash of 2010,19 which de-
stroyed nearly $1 trillion in market capitalization in minutes, and cautions about 
future crashes.  Part III then highlights new financial vulnerabilities by discussing 
the threats of hackers, worms, viruses, spies, thieves, and other antagonists.  Ulti-
mately, it calls for greater regulatory vigilance about such threats, but it cautions 
against thoughtless overreactions that would inhibit the “generativity” of cy-fi.20 
Part IV foreshadows and contends with emerging systemic issues.  It explores 
several key emerging normative consequences.  First, Part IV warns of two systemic 
risks borne out of the enhanced velocity and connectivity of cyborg finance that 
this Article has respectively termed “too fast to save” and “too linked to fail.”  It 
suggests that these two emerging, systemic risks warrant more regulatory attention.  
Second, Part IV comments on the ongoing race between law and finance, and it 
discusses the contest’s larger effects as finance continues to outpace law.  It identifies 
mismatches in jurisdiction and origination as core problems of law’s lagging per-
formance.  Third, Part IV studies the impact of growing resource disparities be-
tween the regulators and the regulated, and among players within the financial 
industry. 
  
18. While cyborg finance is ubiquitous throughout all facets of modern finance, it is most prominent in 
equity markets.  Thus, this Article gives special emphasis to cyborg finance in connection with equity 
markets. 
19. See generally COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FINDINGS 
REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010, at 1 (2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf (summarizing and evaluating the events occurring on 
May 6, 2010) [hereinafter CFTC & SEC FINDINGS]. 
20. Jonathan Zittrain suggested that the internet and its related information technology contained an 
inherent capacity for innovation that he called “generativity.”  See Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative 
Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1975, 1980 (2006) (“Generativity denotes a technology’s overall cap-
acity to produce unprompted change driven by large, varied, and uncoordinated audiences.”). 
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Part V looks further into the future.  It offers a defense for humans in finance 
and society as machines rise.  It predicates this defense on the persistence of ran-
domness and the necessity of humans in an era of ascendant machines.  Part V 
offers testimony about the limitations of computers and artificial intelligence in life 
and finance.  It then cross-examines modernity’s choice between humans and ma-
chines as a recasting of law’s choice between rules and standards.21  Part V rests 
with an exposition on the essential symbiosis between smarter humans and smart 
machines as the key to better returns and better futures in an uncertain world. 
I. THE RISE OF MACHINES 
A chief attribute of the recent past, the ongoing present, and the coming fu-
ture is the rise of machines and the increasing reliance on computers and artificial 
intelligence.  In 1965, Gordon Moore, the founder of Intel, predicted that the 
number of components on integrated circuits would increase exponentially about 
every two years and costs would fall correspondingly, leading to incredible progres-
sions in computing power and electronic processing capacity.22  Moore’s prediction 
turned out to be so accurate that it is now commonly known as “Moore’s Law.”23  
Since then, technological advances have made computing power and digital stor-
age faster, cheaper, and smaller.24  The average smartphone today has more com-
puting capacity than large mainframe computers in previous eras.25  A single iPhone 
today possesses more computing power than NASA did during its first lunar mis-
  
21. For an overview of the legal debate between rules and standards, see Colin S. Diver, The Optimal 
Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1984), Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An 
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1993), Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Essay, Inducing Moral 
Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214 (2010), Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
22 (1993), and Cass R. Sunstein, Problems With Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953 (1995). 
22. Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components Onto Integrated Circuits, ELECTRONICS, Apr. 19, 
1965, at 114, 114–15. 
23. See NICHOLAS CARR, THE BIG SWITCH: REWIRING THE WORLD, FROM EDISON TO 
GOOGLE 58 (2009). 
24. See NICHOLAS CARR, THE SHALLOWS: WHAT THE INTERNET IS DOING TO OUR BRAINS 
83 (2011) (“[T]he price of a typical computing task has dropped by 99.9 percent since the 1960s.”); 
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), 21ST CENTURY TECHNOLOGIES: 
PROMISES AND PERILS OF A DYNAMIC FUTURE 9 (1998) (stating that “[f]aster, cheaper, [and] 
smaller” are the key objectives of the technology sector); Chip Walter, Kryder’s Law, SCI. AM., Aug. 
2005, at 32. 
25. See, e.g., How Your Nokia Smartphone Compares With PCs of the Past, CONVERSATIONS BY NOKIA 
(Mar. 18, 2011), http://nokiaconnects.com/2011/03/18/how-your-nokia-smartphone-compares-
with-pcs-of-the-past (describing how a smartphone contains thousands of times the memory and 
processing power of the average 1980s computer). 
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sion.26  Such technological progress has led to an increasingly ubiquitous presence 
of machines in our world.27  This ascent of machines has had a profound impact 
on society in general and on finance in particular. 
A. In Society 
The increased reliance on machines, particularly computers, has had signifi-
cant social effects.  A generation ago, computers were bulky, sedentary tools for 
data computation and word processing; not every business or home had one.  Today, 
computers are everywhere, in every form—from large mainframes to pocket-
sized smartphones, from desktops to laptops, from visible to invisible.28  Globally, 
more than 350 million personal computers were sold in 2011 alone.29  And because 
of high-speed connectivity and the internet, in many parts of the world, anyone 
with a computer or smartphone has instant access to a plethora of information, 
services, and entertainment.30  Compared to bulky, obtuse computers of previous 
generations, today’s computers are smart machines powered by artificial intelli-
gence.31  Computers and their progeny have changed the way we learn, think, 
work, play, love, and live.32  In short, just as humans have changed computers, 
computers have changed humans.33 
  
26. MICHIO KAKU, PHYSICS OF THE FUTURE: HOW SCIENCE WILL SHAPE HUMAN DESTINY 
AND OUR DAILY LIVES BY THE YEAR 2100, at 21 (2011). 
27. See CARR, supra note 23, at 45–56 (tracing the creation and proliferation of computers); MAURICE 
ESTABROOKS, ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY, CORPORATE STRATEGY, AND WORLD 
TRANSFORMATION 2 (1995). 
28. See DEBORAH MORLEY, UNDERSTANDING COMPUTERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 44 (4th 
ed. 2011). 
29. See Press Release, Gartner, Inc., Gartner Says PC Shipments to Slow to 3.8 Percent Growth in 
2011; Units to Increase 10.9 Percent in 2012 (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp? 
id=1786014&source=email_rt_mc. 
30. See WILLIAM POWERS, HAMLET’S BLACKBERRY: BUILDING A GOOD LIFE IN THE DIGITAL 
AGE 14 (2010) (“For the last decade, we’ve worked hard to bring digital connectedness into every 
available corner of existence and, once it’s there, to make it ever faster and more seamless.”). 
31. Steven Levy, The AI Revolution, WIRED, Jan. 2011, at 88 (describing the rise of artificial intelligence 
in modern life). 
32. See, e.g., STACEY L. EDGAR, MORALITY AND MACHINES: PERSPECTIVES ON COMPUTER 
ETHICS 1 (2003); EUGENE F. PROVENZO, JR. ET AL., COMPUTERS, CURRICULUM, AND 
CULTURAL CHANGE: AN INTRODUCTION FOR TEACHERS 18 (2005); SHERRY TURKLE, THE 
SECOND SELF: COMPUTERS AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT 287–88 (MIT Press 20th anniv. ed. 
2005) (1984) (“[Computers and] the Internet changed every aspect of life in communications, eco-
nomics, politics, and the arts.  But [they] also changed how we saw ourselves and our relationships.”); 
Stephen Marche, Is Facebook Making Us Lonely?, ATLANTIC, May 2012, at 62 (“In a world 
consumed by ever more novel modes of socializing, we have less and less actual society.  We live in 
an accelerating contradiction: the more connected we become, the lonelier we are.”). 
33. See CARR, supra note 24, at 6–8 (discussing how the internet affects our cognitive functions and abili-
ties); SHERRY TURKLE, ALONE TOGETHER: WHY WE EXPECT MORE FROM TECHNOLOGY 
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Computers have increased business productivity and enhanced personal effi-
ciency.34  Assembly lines of laborers have been replaced by computer-operated 
robots, which can often perform tasks with greater precision at lower costs.35  Online 
retailers such as Amazon now use robots in their distribution centers to help fill 
orders at cheaper rates and higher speeds.36  Artificial intelligence software is 
replacing journalists in writing news stories.37  Digital forms that computers process 
in seconds have replaced reams of hand-filled documents that previously required 
countless hours of human labor to process.38  Entire businesses and labor catego-
ries have shrunk or disappeared from plain view because of computerization and 
automation.39  Think about the last time you used a travel agency to book a flight.  
Or the last time you used a phone book to look for a phone number.40  Many of 
these machine-driven changes have made business activities more productive and 
personal activities more efficient.41 
  
AND LESS FROM EACH OTHER 279–81 (2011) (discussing how technology affects human be-
havior). 
34. See, e.g., Quentin Hardy, The Matrix of Soap, FORBES, Aug. 22, 2011, at 32 (reporting on how one 
company utilizes supercomputer data analysis to manage its global businesses in real time); Daniel 
Lyons, Who Needs Humans, NEWSWEEK, July 25, 2011, at 28 (discussing how robotics has changed 
labor force composition). 
35. See, e.g., JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren, in ESSAYS IN 
PERSUASION 358, 364 (Norton Library 1963) (1931) (warning of a “new disease” of “technological 
unemployment,” in which jobs are lost because of rapid technological progress (emphasis omitted)); 
David H. Autor et al., The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration, 
118 Q.J. ECON. 1279 (2003) (explaining how computerization accelerates the substitution of mach-
inery for human labor). 
36. See Joseph Galante, Rise of the Orange Machines, BUS. WK., Nov. 15, 2010, at 47. 
37. See Steven Levy, The Rise of the Robot Reporter, WIRED, May 2012, at 132. 
38. IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS: WHY THINKING-BY-NUMBERS IS THE NEW WAY TO BE 
SMART 129 (2007). 
39. See W. Brian Arthur, The Second Economy, MCKINSEY Q., Oct. 2011, at 92 (discussing how tech-
nology has replaced human labor with electronic and digital processes in many areas). 
40. For readers in the distant future, there was a time when individuals in this country used a large bulky 
book printed on low-stock paper weighing multiple pounds to locate the telephone number of busi-
nesses and individuals manually.  For a history of phone books, see AMMON SHEA, THE PHONE 
BOOK: THE CURIOUS HISTORY OF THE BOOK THAT EVERYONE USES BUT NO ONE READS 
(2010). 
41. This increase in productivity has arguably come at some cost to individuals and society.  For individ-
uals, it could be argued that our brains have become less adept at deep thought because of increased 
reliance on computers.  For society, it could be argued that virtual interactions and online connections 
have taken the place of meaningful physical interactions and real connections.  See CARR, supra note 
24, at 120–26 (explaining how the internet affects our cognitive functions); JARON LANIER, YOU 
ARE NOT A GADGET: A MANIFESTO 1–14 (2010) (noting the social effects of computerization); 
POWERS, supra note 30, at 50–52 (explicating on the detrimental symptoms of digital technology); 
TURKLE, supra note 32, at 279–81 (discussing how computers affects interpersonal and intraper-
sonal behavior). 
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In addition to increasing business productivity and personal efficiency, the use 
of computers has also increased our capacity to be informed and, thus, to act with 
better information.  Modern data analysis with supercomputers has made everyone 
with a smartphone a walking encyclopedia.42  Arguments about trivia, questions 
about directions, and curiosities about the esoteric can readily be satisfied by a few 
simple taps or voice commands to one’s smartphone.43 
Beyond mere access to more information, modern machines have changed 
the way we evaluate and respond to information.  Data aggregation, analysis, re-
trieval, and transmission by computers on grand scales, collectively and colloqui-
ally referred to as Big Data, are changing the way we process information, what 
we learn from that information, and how we behave based on that information.44  
Supercomputers are now used to predict when and where storms will strike with 
meaningful accuracy.45  Computer analysis of Shakespeare’s plays is modifying 
the way we understand the Bard.46  Data analysis has created a new field of sports 
scouting, known as sabermetrics.47  Computers sorting through mountains of da-
ta are advising candidates on how to campaign for political office.48  Data analysis 
by companies like Netflix and Amazon has altered how we make purchases and 
select entertainment.49  Modern machines have even changed the way people date 
(and find love) using data.50 
The future holds more promises from computerized machinery in a host of 
different fields and functions.  Big Data will change consumer habits in ways that 
  
42. See AYRES, supra note 38, at 154 (“The ability to digitalize and store information means that any 
laptop with access to the Internet can now access libraries several times the size of the library of 
Alexandria.”). 
43. See David Pogue, New iPhone Conceals Sheer Magic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2011, at B1 (describing 
the speech recognition features of the iPhone 4S). 
44. See, e.g., NATE SILVER, THE SIGNAL AND THE NOISE: WHY SOME PREDICTIONS FAIL—
BUT SOME DON’T 9–10 (2012); Andrew McAfee & Erik Brynjolfsson, Big Data: The Management 
Revolution, HARV. BUS. REV., Oct. 2012, at 60, 62–68 (discussing Big Data’s impact on corp-
orations); Ashlee Vance, The Data Knows, BUS. WK., Sept. 12, 2011, at 71 (reporting on the impact 
of data analysis on individual and societal behavior). 
45. See Eliza Strickland, Supercomputers Predict a Stormy Hurricane Season, IEEE SPECTRUM, July 2011, 
at 11. 
46. See Tom Post, Bits and the Bard, FORBES, June 27, 2011, at 46. 
47. See GABRIEL B. COSTA ET AL., PRACTICING SABERMETRICS: PUTTING THE SCIENCE OF 
BASEBALL STATISTICS TO WORK 5–8 (2009). 
48. See Julianna Goldman, The Obama Campaign’s Secret Weapon: Geeks, BUS. WK., Dec. 19, 2011, at 39. 
49. See AYRES, supra note 38, at 19–20. 
50. See Nick Paumgarten, Looking for Someone, NEW YORKER, July 4, 2011, at 36, 37–38; Jenna 
Wortham, With an App, Your Next Date Could Be Just Around the Corner, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2011, 
at A1. 
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we cannot fully foresee.51  Robots will likely play a larger role in warfare and other 
military affairs.52  Computers will probably make activities like driving unmanned 
efforts.53  Google has already built a car that drives itself using artificial intelligence.54  
In sum, whereas society once viewed computers as crude machines of limited util-
ity, society now views modern computerized machines as intelligent, indispensible 
tools—with many yet unrealized possibilities—that are becoming more intertwined 
with our very existence.55 
B. In Finance 
Over the last quarter century, computerization and artificial intelligence have 
revolutionized finance, and they continue to fundamentally transform finance 
from an industry dominated by humans to one in which humans and machines 
share dominion.56  Modern finance is cyborg finance, an industry in which the key 
players are part human and part machine.  
This transformation resulted from advances in technology and regulatory 
reforms over the last few decades.  Beginning in the 1990s, advances in technology 
encouraged the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to introduce reforms  
 
  
51. See generally Natasha Singer, You for Sale, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2012, at BU1 (reporting on the 
development of consumer data analytics and the potential privacy and customer classification con-
cerns that may result). 
52. See Elizabeth Bumiller & Thom Shanker, War Evolves With Drones, Some Tiny As Bugs, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 20, 2011, at A1 (reporting on the United States’s increased use of unmanned aerial drones in 
warfare); John Markoff, War Machines: Recruiting Robots for Combat, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2010, at 
A1 (discussing the impact of robotics on future warfare). 
53. At the same time, certain technological advances have actually made humans more likely to perform 
some routine tasks.  See, e.g., Craig Lambert, Our Unpaid, Extra Shadow Work, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
30, 2011, at SR12 (“Although the automatons were supposedly going to free people by taking on 
life’s menial, repetitive tasks, frequently, technological innovation actually offloads such jobs onto 
human beings.”). 
54. See John Markoff, Look Officer, No Hands: Google Car Drives Itself, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2010, at A1. 
55. See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller & Nick Bilton, Google’s Lab of Wildest Dreams, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 
2011, at A1; Ashlee Vance, Merely Human? So Yesterday, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2011, at BU1 
(reporting on futurists who envision a time when “human beings and machines will so effortlessly 
and elegantly merge that poor health, the ravages of old age and even death itself will all be things of 
the past”); David Weinberger, The Machine That Would Predict the Future, SCI. AM., Dec. 2011, at 52. 
56. See Frank J. Fabozzi et al., High-Frequency Trading: Methodologies and Market Impact, 19 REV. 
FUTURES MARKETS 7, 9–10 (2011) (describing continuing changes in computerized trading in 
finance); Michael J. McGowan, The Rise of Computerized High Frequency Trading: Use and 
Controversy, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV., no. 16, at i, iv–vii (chronicling the history of algorithmic 
trading); Felix Salmon & Jon Stokes, Bull vs. Bear vs. Bot, WIRED, Jan. 2011, at 91 (“Algorithms have 
become so ingrained in our financial system that the markets could not operate without them.”). 
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like decimalization57 and Regulation Alternative Trading System (Reg ATS)58 to 
permit new trading systems and electronic communication networks for finance, 
which made today’s Wall Street possible.59  Electronic communication networks 
yielded direct market access, which allowed firms to execute trades on an exchange 
directly without going through an intermediary such as a salesperson or a market 
maker.60  By the mid-1990s, computers took over significant functions at major fi-
nancial institutions.61  By then, computerized networks initiated and managed 
significant trading in many important financial markets such as stocks, bonds, 
currency, and commodities.62 
Later in 2005, the SEC passed Regulation National Market System (Reg 
NMS)63 to further increase competition and access to financial trading.64  Reg NMS 
aimed “to bind together the fragmented electronic marketplace into a single in-
terlinked web of trading—a true national market system.”65  These and other reg-
  
57. See STAFF OF THE SEC, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON DECIMALIZATION 4 (2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/decimalization-072012.pdf (“Prior to implementing decimal 
pricing in April 2001, the U.S. equity market used fractions as pricing increments, and had done so 
for hundreds of years.”). 
58. See Regulation ATS—Alternative Trading Systems, 17 C.F.R. § 242.300(a) (2012); see also 
EDWARD F. GREENE ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES AND 
DERIVATIVES MARKETS § 14.10, at 10-133 (9th ed. 2009) (“In the [Reg ATS], the SEC expanded 
its interpretation of an ‘exchange’ under the Exchange Act to include a broad range of electronic 
trading systems . . . .”). 
59. See SAL ARNUK & JOSEPH SALUZZI, BROKEN MARKETS: HOW HIGH FREQUENCY 
TRADING AND PREDATORY PRACTICES ON WALL STREET ARE DESTROYING INVESTOR 
CONFIDENCE AND YOUR PORTFOLIO 68–78 (2012); BRIAN R. BROWN, CHASING THE 
SAME SIGNALS: HOW BLACK-BOX TRADING INFLUENCES STOCK MARKETS FROM WALL 
STREET TO SHANGHAI 2 (2010); DAVID J. LEINWEBER, NERDS ON WALL STREET: MATH, 
MACHINES, AND WIRED MARKETS 31–64 (2009). 
60. ARNUK & SALUZZI, supra note 59, 68–78. 
61. See, e.g., RAY KURZWEIL, THE AGE OF SPIRITUAL MACHINES: WHEN COMPUTERS EXCEED 
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 70 (1999); Markku Malkamäki & Jukka Topi, Future Challenges for 
Securities and Derivative Markets, in 3 RESEARCH IN BANKING AND FINANCE 359, 382 (Iftekhar 
Hasan & William C. Hunter eds., 2003) (“At the end of the 1990s, between 30% and 40% of all 
U.S. securities transactions were channeled through the Internet and about 15% of all the U.S. equity 
trades were done on-line.”). 
62. KURZWEIL, supra note 61, at 70; see also William M. Bulkeley, Computers Take On New Role as 
Experts in Financial Affairs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 1986, at 23. 
63. 17 C.F.R. § 242.601. 
64. See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,621–32 (June 29, 2005) (codified as amended at 17 
C.F.R. §§ 242.600–242.612); see also Laura Nyantung Beny, U.S. Secondary Stock Markets: A Survey 
of Current Regulatory and Structural Issues and a Reform Proposal to Enhance Competition, 2002 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 399, 426 (“[T]he express purpose of the NMS [is] to promote efficiency and competi-
tion across secondary markets.”). 
65. SCOTT PATTERSON, DARK POOLS: HIGH-SPEED TRADERS, AI BANDITS, AND THE THREAT 
TO THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 49 (2012). 
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ulatory reforms opened access for firms to leverage new technology in finance.66  
Coupled with technological advances in computer science and the growth of dig-
itized information, such reforms gave birth to a new form of finance in which 
complex mathematical models processed by computers at warp speed played crit-
ical roles in the most important decisions concerning capital allocation and risk 
assessment.67  According to some experts, today “Wall Street is essentially floating 
on a sea of mathematics and computer power.”68  This financial current is one that 
flows beyond Wall Street and America to all parts of the world. 
A key feature of cy-fi is the use of incredibly powerful and fast computers to 
analyze and execute trading opportunities based on complex mathematical mod-
els.69  Many have referred to computer-programmed trading collectively as “black 
box trading.”70  Today, almost every major financial institution and hedge fund 
employs black box trading in one form or another.71 
Two prominent, interrelated forms of black box trading are algorithmic trad-
ing and high-frequency trading.  Algorithmic trading utilizes preset formulas to 
buy, sell, and hold positions in various financial instruments.72  Computers often 
exclusively execute these complex formulas without any human interference after 
the initial installation.73  Computers are programmed to “automatically capture and 
read market data in real-time, transmit thousands of order messages per second 
to an exchange, and execute, cancel, or replace orders based on new information on 
prices or demand.”74  Technology has become so sophisticated that within mere 
seconds of a securities filing or news report, computers can essentially read them 
  
66. See, e.g., Melanie Rodier, Wall Street Firms Fine-Tune Reg NMS Compliance, Look Ahead at the 
Future, WALL ST. & TECH. (June 12, 2007), http://www.wallstreetandtech.com/articles/199903415. 
67. For an overview of contemporary quantitative trading and its leading players, see generally SCOTT 
PATTERSON, THE QUANTS: HOW A NEW BREED OF MATH WHIZZES CONQUERED WALL 
STREET AND NEARLY DESTROYED IT (2010). 
68. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 44 (2011) (quoting 
Interview by Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n With Scott Patterson (Aug. 12, 2010)). 
69. See PATTERSON, supra note 65, at 36–38 (describing the rise of powerful, high-speed computers in 
finance). 
70. See BROWN, supra note 59, at 8 (“A ‘black box’ is a quantitative investment strategy in which the 
decisions are defined by mathematical formulas.”). 
71. See id. at 2, 11. 
72. ROBERT A.G. MONKS & ALEXANDRA REED LAJOUX, CORPORATE VALUATION FOR 
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT: ANALYZING ASSETS, EARNINGS, CASH FLOW, STOCK PRICE, 
GOVERNANCE, AND SPECIAL SITUATIONS 229 (2011). 
73. See CFTC & SEC FINDINGS, supra note 19, at 2–3 (discussing automation in high-frequency 
trading); PATTERSON, supra note 65, at 128–30; David M. Serritella, High Speed Trading Begets High 
Speed Regulation: SEC Response to Flash Crash, Rash, 2010 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 433, 436 
(“Automation is a crucial element in HFT [high frequency trading].”). 
74. Fabozzi et al., supra note 56, at 8. 
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and send summaries to traders and investors.75  Computers running algorithmic 
programs can process a deluge of information in real time, spot trends, and react 
accordingly within seconds.76  Investment decisions that previously took dozens of 
people minutes or even hours to analyze and execute now take only seconds by a 
single computer. 
Algorithmic trading and its progenies have grown so prevalent that the 
landmark trading floor of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has become a 
relic of a bygone era as human traders give way to computers on the Big Board’s 
famed floor.77  In fact, most equity trading today takes place in shadowy, less-
regulated private markets instead of lit, better-regulated exchanges like the NYSE 
or NASDAQ.78  Moreover, rather than defend the virtues of transparent, better 
regulated exchanges for trading, the traditional exchanges have initiated steps to 
create robust, less transparent markets themselves and have aided computerized 
trading to the detriment of human trading.79  In 2012, the SEC fined the NYSE 
$5 million for inappropriately sharing trading data with certain computerized 
traders before sharing it with all the other traders.80  Later in December 2012, the 
IntercontinentalExchange, an electronic derivatives and commodities exchange, 
announced a takeover of the NYSE.81  In light of these developments, it is probably 
safe to predict that a day will come in the near future when human traders no longer 
roam the NYSE’s famed trading floor. 
While significant volumes of algorithmic trading still occur on public ex-
changes, a growing volume of trades are taking place in private exchanges and 
dark pools, away from the purview of the public.82  “A dark pool is an anonymous 
  
75. See ARNUK & SALUZZI, supra note 59, at 121 (“Machine-readable news data feeds enable HFT 
computers to react within microseconds to news events, beating out traditional institutional and 
retail investors.”); Helen Coster, Search and Disrupt, FORBES, Sept. 26, 2011, at 60 (profiling software 
that reads and summarizes federal securities filings in seconds). 
76. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, Stock Traders Find Speed Pays, in Milliseconds, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2009, 
at A1 (“[Algorithmic computer programs] can spot trends before other investors can blink, changing 
orders and strategies within milliseconds.”). 
77. See, e.g., Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom the Bell Tolls: The Demise of Exchange 
Trading Floors and the Growth of ECNs, 33 J. CORP. L. 865, 866 (2008) (“Exchange trading floors are 
fast fading into history as the trading of stocks and derivative instruments moves to electronic 
communications networks (ECNs) that simply match trades by computers through algorithms.”). 
78. See Nathaniel Popper, Public Exchanges Duel With Newcomers Over Trade Transparency, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 27, 2012, at B1. 
79. Id. 
80. In re N.Y. Stock Exch. LLC, No. 3-15023, Exchange Act Release No. 67,857 (Sept. 14, 2012), 
2012 SEC LEXIS 2921, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2012/34-67857.pdf. 
81. Ben Protess & Nathaniel Popper, Exchange Sale Reflects New Realities of Trading, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
21, 2012, at A1. 
82. See Regulation of Non-public Trading Interest, 74 Fed. Reg. 61,208 (proposed Nov. 23, 2009) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242); Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement 
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crossing network that allows institutions to hide their orders from the mar-
ketplace.”83  Private exchanges and dark pools are particularly attractive to many 
institutional investors, who prefer to move large volumes of securities without 
disseminating too much information to the public so as not to lose any informa-
tional advantages to competitors that may mimic their trades.84  Unlike public ex-
changes, which are partially constrained by geography and physical space, private 
exchanges and dark pools can exist anywhere because they frequently exist in cy-
berspace, a frontier without similar physical and geographic limitations.85  In 
2010, more than 60 percent of trading in stocks listed on the NYSE occurred on 
separate computerized exchanges.86  Partially as a result of private exchanges and 
dark pools, a “shadow banking” infrastructure now casts a large penumbra over 
the financial system.87 
In addition to algorithmic trading, the other prominent form of black box 
trading is high-frequency trading.88  High-frequency trading refers to trading that 
uses computerized platforms to execute a large number of trades at super speeds.89  
The velocity of high-frequency trading is measured not in minutes but in seconds 
and milliseconds.90  For many institutional traders utilizing high-frequency trad-
ing, the volume and value of the trades can exceed $1 billion and one billion units 
  
on Dark Pool Regulation Before the Commission Open Meeting (Oct. 21, 2009) (transcript 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch102109mls.htm); ARNUK & SALUZZI, supra 
note 59, at 62 (describing the rise in nonpublic dark pools and alternative trading systems over the 
last decade); PATTERSON, supra note 65, at 61–62; Matthew Philips, Where Has All the Trading 
Gone?, BUS. WK., May 14, 2012, at 49 (reporting on the migration of trading from public exchanges 
to dark pools). 
83. BROWN, supra note 59, at 116. 
84. See id. 
85. See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. 
L. REV. 1367, 1367 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 501, 514–15 (1999). 
86. Nelson D. Schwartz & Louise Story, Surge of Computer Selling After Apparent Trading Glitch Sends 
Stocks Plunging, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2010, at B7. 
87. See, e.g., GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007, at 6–8 
(2010) (noting the growing importance of the shadow banking system in modern finance); DAVID 
SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS 
(UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 62 (2011) (discussing deregulation, financial innovation, and 
the birth of shadow banking); Andrew W. Lo, Regulatory Reform in the Wake of the Financial Crisis of 
2007–2008, 1 J. FIN. ECON. POL’Y 4, 14–18 (2009) (summarizing the reach of the shadow banking 
system). 
88. It should be noted that algorithmic trading is not mutually exclusive from high-frequency trading, 
which is frequently driven by algorithmic models.  See ARNUK & SALUZZI, supra note 59, at 2–3. 
89. See IRENE ALDRIDGE, HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ALGORITHMIC 
STRATEGIES AND TRADING SYSTEMS 1 (2010); ARNUK & SALUZZI, supra note 59, at 2; see also 
Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-61,358, 75 Fed. Reg. 
3594, 3598 (proposed Jan. 21, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242). 
90. Fabozzi et al., supra note 56, at 8. 
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daily.91  Under normal circumstances, high-frequency trading can be a positive 
force in markets, increasing liquidity and decreasing volatility in the short term by 
enhancing trade volume and execution speeds.92  During periods of high uncer-
tainty, however, high-frequency trading can exacerbate volatility and hurt liquidity 
by removing significant trading positions from the markets at warp speeds.93 
Over the last decade, high-frequency trading has grown more prevalent in 
finance.  Between 2004 and 2010, high-frequency trading increased from about 
13 percent of all foreign-exchange flows to 30 percent.94  In the five-year period 
from 2005 to 2010, daily trading volume on the NYSE increased by 164 percent.95  
This increase in trading volume is attributable to the rise of high-frequency trading.  
By 2011, high-frequency trading “account[ed] for about 60 percent of the seven 
billion shares that change hands daily on United States stock markets,”96 and for 
about 35 to 40 percent of European equities trading volume.97 
Aside from being faster and less human than previous forms of trading, black 
box trading can be incredibly profitable.  “Hedge funds on average gained 10.4 
percent annualized, net of fees, from July 1, 1993, through 2010,” with top funds 
generating even better returns employing black box trading platforms.98  Renaissance 
Technologies, one of the most successful hedge funds, averaged annual returns of 
35 percent (after exceptionally high fees) for nearly two decades following 1990, 
and “[i]n 2008, . . . [its] flagship Medallion Fund gained approximately 80 percent.”99  
The success of black box trading extends beyond the boutique confines of the hedge 
fund world and into bulge bracket investment banks.100  Every major investment 
bank in the world employs some form of black box trading with its own proprietary 
software.101  In 2010, with the aid of black box trading, Bank of America and J.P. 
  
91. See Eric Dash & Christine Hauser, As Dizzying Week Ends on Wall St., Dangers Linger, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 13, 2011, at A1. 
92. See FRANK PARTNOY, WAIT: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF DELAY 43 (2012). 
93. See ARNUK & SALUZZI, supra note 59, at 16; PARTNOY, supra note 92, at 43. 
94. Neil Shah, High-Speed Traders Dive Into Forex Despite Doubts, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704677404576284921020282968.html. 
95. Duhigg, supra note 76. 
96. Graham Bowley, Fast Traders, in Spotlight, Battle Rules, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2011, at A1. 
97. Fabozzi et al., supra note 56, at 8. 
98. Richard Teitelbaum, Morgan Stanley Yoga-Troubadour-Crossword-Math Pro Muller Flees, BLOOMBERG 
MARKETS MAG., July 7, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-07/morgan-stanley-s-
yoga-troubadour-crossword-math-pro-flees-with-20-returns.html. 
99. RISHI K. NARANG, INSIDE THE BLACK BOX: THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT QUANTITATIVE 
TRADING 4 (2009). 
100. See PATTERSON, supra note 67, at 12 (discussing how quantitative trading had “transform[ed] white-
shoe bank companies into hot-rod hedge fund vehicles”). 
101. See An Introduction to Financial Software Development, SCOTTLOGIC, http://www.scottlogic.co.uk/ 
careers/financial-software-development (last visited Nov. 24, 2012) (“All of the large financial insti-
tutions (e.g. investment banks) have their own software development teams.”). 
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Morgan had two perfect trading quarters, which means that their trading desks 
were profitable every day for six months of the year.102  Because of its lucrative po-
tential, trading and trading-related revenues now account for a significant portion 
of profits and operations for many financial institutions.103 
Beyond trading, in the age of cy-fi, computers with artificial intelligence are 
used for asset management and risk assessment.104  BlackRock, the world’s largest 
asset management firm, uses its proprietary system, Aladdin, to help clients allocate 
capital, measure risk, and manage risk.105  Aladdin can analyze stocks, bonds, de-
rivatives, and other complex financial instruments.106  During the financial crisis of 
2008, with the help of Aladdin, BlackRock aided the U.S. Treasury Department 
with the bailouts related to Bear Stearns, AIG, Citigroup, Fannie Mae, and 
Freddie Mac.107 
In sum, increased reliance on computerization and artificial intelligence in 
finance has fundamentally transformed modern finance into cyborg finance, an 
industry that is faster, larger, more global, more interconnected, and less human 
than its previous iterations.108 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE INVESTOR 
The transformation of modern finance into cyborg finance has precipitated 
a conceptual evolution in prevailing legal understandings of financial regulation’s 
main character: the investor.  With the aid of computers, a new aspirational in-
vestor paradigm has emerged and holds the potential to be more informed, more 
diversified, more rational, and faster than previous paradigms.  And law must become 
more cognizant of this emerging, new investor paradigm in order to remain effec-
tive. 
  
102. See generally Dawn Kopecki, BofA, JPMorgan Reprise Perfect Trading Records, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 9, 
2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-09/jpmorgan-reprises-perfect-trading-record-as-
goldman-posts-two-losing-days.html. 
103. See DAVID P. STOWELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO INVESTMENT BANKS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND 
PRIVATE EQUITY: THE NEW PARADIGM 97–111 (2010) (discussing the prevalence of institutional 
financial trading). 
104. See Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk 
Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127, 130–35 (2009). 
105. Aladdin Enterprise Investment System, BLACKROCK, http://www2.blackrock.com/US/brs/investment- 
tools/aladdin (last visited Nov. 24, 2012). 
106. See Sheelah Kolhatkar & Sree Vidya Bhaktavatsalam, The Colossus of Wall Street, BUS. WK., Dec. 
13, 2010, at 60, 66. 
107. Id. at 63. 
108. See Salmon & Stokes, supra note 56, at 93 (“It’s the machines’ market now; we just trade in it.”). 
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A. The Reasonable Investor 
A bedrock concept of financial regulation is “the reasonable investor.”109  
Much of state corporate law and federal securities law exist to protect this para-
gon of investors.110  For example, analysis under Rule 10b-5111 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, revolves around the perspective of the rea-
sonable investor.  The U.S. Supreme Court in the landmark case, TSC Industries, 
Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,112 held that for analyzing materiality for securities fraud 
purposes, 
[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a 
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to 
vote. . . . Put another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that the 
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable 
investor as having significantly altered the “total mix” of information 
made available.113 
Twelve years later, in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,114 the Supreme Court expressly 
adopted this holding for securities litigation under the antifraud provisions of 
Section 10, particularly Rule 10b-5,115 which is considered one of the most im-
portant investor protection measures in financial regulation.116 
Yet, despite the importance of the reasonable investor in financial regulation, 
courts have not spoken with one clear voice on its identity.117  The reasonable inves- 
 
 
 
  
109. See, e.g., David A. Hoffman, The “Duty” to Be a Rational Shareholder, 90 MINN. L. REV. 537, 537–39 
(2006) (highlighting the importance of the reasonable investor construct to federal securities law); 
Margaret V. Sachs, Materiality and Social Change: The Case for Replacing “the Reasonable Investor” 
With “the Least Sophisticated Investor” in Inefficient Markets, 81 TUL. L. REV. 473, 475 (2007). 
110. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, pt. 2, at 5 (1934) (discussing the need to protect individual investors 
in enacting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, pt. 1, at 2 (1933) (highlight-
ing protection for reasonable investors as the purpose of the Securities Act of 1933). 
111. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). 
112. 426 U.S. 438 (1976). 
113. Id. at 449 (emphasis added). 
114. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
115. Id. at 231–32. 
116. See Julie A. Herzog, Fraud Created the Market: An Unwise and Unwarranted Extension of Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 367–70 (1995) (examining the breadth and impact 
of Rule 10b-5); James J. Park, Rule 10b-5 and the Rise of the Unjust Enrichment Principle, 60 DUKE 
L.J. 345, 351–52 (2011) (highlighting the historical importance of Rule 10b-5 in preventing securities 
fraud). 
117. See, e.g., Stefan J. Padfield, Is Puffery Material to Investors? Maybe We Should Ask Them, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. 
& EMP. L. 339, 365 (2008) (acknowledging the unsettled definition of the “reasonable investor”). 
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tor, thus far, has remained anonymous, elusive, and the subject of much inquiry.118  
Legal scholars and commentators have speculated on the reasonable investor’s 
gender,119 temperament,120 and sophistication,121 among other characteristics. 
Despite varying meditations on the reasonable investor, an influential para-
digm has prevailed in financial regulation: the rational actor as the reasonable inves-
tor.122  The rational actor is the homo economicus, the idealized, utility-maximizing 
person from neoclassical economic theory.123  Additionally, regulators have gen-
erally and historically viewed the reasonable investor as a long-term investor, not a 
short-term trader.124 
Rulemaking with the assumption of the rational actor as the reasonable inves-
tor is fairly straightforward since “all human behavior can be viewed as involving 
participants who maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences and accu-
mulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of mar-
kets.”125  Financial regulation is, therefore, structured to equip investors with the 
requisite information and tools so that “investors can protect themselves against 
corporate abuses and mismanagement” in relatively efficient markets.126  As a mat-
ter of practice, this regulatory modus operandi has resulted in more disclosure by 
  
118. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Female Investors and Securities Fraud: Is the Reasonable Investor 
a Woman?, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291, 293–94 (2009). 
119. See id. at 294–95. 
120. See Peter H. Huang, Moody Investing and the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Materiality of Information 
and the Reasonableness of Investors, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 99, 100–04 (2005) (theorizing that 
reasonable investors invest based on attitudes and noncognitive factors beyond risk and return). 
121. Compare Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up as They Go Along: The Role of Law in Securities 
Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1037 (2002) (“[T]oday’s ‘reasonable investors’ are ex-
pected to possess a certain level of understanding and sophistication . . . .”), and Heminway, supra 
note 118, at 301–02 (advancing arguments supporting the sophisticated investor as the reasonable 
investor), with Sachs, supra note 109, at 475–76 (claiming that the most reasonable investors are those 
who are least sophisticated). 
122. See Heminway, supra note 118, at 297 (“Decisional law and the related literature support the view 
that the reasonable investor is a rational investor . . . .”); Huang, supra note 120, at 111 (“[M]any courts 
appear to view the reasonable investor as referring to a normative idealized type of behavior, instead 
of a descriptive realistic depiction of actual behavior.”). 
123. Carlos Rodriguez-Sickert, Homo Economicus, in HANDBOOK OF ECONOMICS AND ETHICS 223, 
223 (Jan Peil & Irene van Staveren eds., 2009). 
124. See, e.g., Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,500 (June 29, 2005) (“Indeed, the core concern 
for the welfare of long-term investors . . . was first expressed in the foundation documents of the 
Exchange Act itself.”). 
125. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976). 
126. Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 
81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 418 (2003). 
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corporations,127 increased governmental supervision,128 and enhanced direct govern-
ance tools, like “say-on-pay,” for investors.129  
In meaningful ways, the rational actor assumption has served regulators, 
legislators, and investors well for many decades.  Despite serious financial crises, it 
has predicated a regulatory framework that, while imperfect, is by many accounts 
the envy of the developed world,130 producing lengthy periods of significant wealth 
creation and economic growth.131  It is, in part, because of such success that the 
paradigm of the rational actor as the reasonable investor remains so embedded in 
law and finance. 
B. The Irrational Investor 
New research has challenged and refined the rational investor paradigm, and 
it has introduced an alternative paradigm, the irrational investor.132  The rational 
investor paradigm, while prevalent and instructive, is not perfect.133  An original 
sin of the rational investor paradigm is the assumption that real individuals are 
always rational like their economic kin.134  Whereas rational actors comprehend 
  
127. See, e.g., Tom C.W. Lin, A Behavioral Framework for Securities Risk, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 325, 
336 (2011) (“In practice, this assumption has produced a regulatory framework that emphasizes more 
information over less information, more disclosure over better disclosure, quantity over quality.”). 
128. See, e.g., Drake Bennett & Carter Dougherty, She’s With the Government and She’s Here to Help, BUS. 
WK., July 11, 2011, at 58, 60–64 (chronicling efforts to establish the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau as a sentinel for protecting investors and consumers). 
129. Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation, Exchange 
Act Release No. 33-9178, 76 Fed. Reg. 6010, 6013 (Feb. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
229, 240, 249) (granting shareholders a nonbinding vote on certain executive compensation matters). 
130. See CHARLES ROXBURGH ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS: 
ENTERING A NEW ERA 9 (2009) (charting the growth of U.S. capital markets); Bengt Holmstrom 
& Steven N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What’s Right and What’s Wrong?, J. 
APPLIED CORP. FIN., Spring 2003, at 8, 8–11 (“Despite the alleged flaws in its governance system, 
the U.S. economy has performed very well, both on an absolute basis and particularly relative to 
other countries.  U.S. productivity gains in the past decade have been exceptional, and the U.S. stock 
market has consistently outperformed other world indices over the last two decades . . . .”). 
131. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 
FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 20–21 (2005) (detailing the rise of the U.S. gross domestic product since 
1940). 
132. See David Brooks, The Unexamined Society, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2011, at A23 (“[T]oday we are in 
the middle of a golden age of behavioral research.  Thousands of researchers are studying the way 
actual behavior differs from the way we assume people behave.”); see also BEHAVIORAL LAW & 
ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). 
133. A pillar of the influential field of behavioral economics is built on challenging the rational actor 
assumption of neoclassical economics.  See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral 
Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998). 
134. See David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as 
Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1047 n.151 (1989) (“[E]conomists who assume that people 
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and synthesize information perfectly, real individuals do not.135  Whereas rational 
actors make decisions dispassionately without being influenced by irrelevant fac-
tors, real individuals often make decisions based on emotions, biases, and irrelevant 
stimuli.136  Whereas rational actors live in a simple world filled with other perfectly 
monochromatic, rational actors, real individuals exist in a complex world filled with 
other flawed, colorful characters.  Plainly stated, real individuals and real investors 
are not rational actors.  
Despite their incongruence with rational actors, real investors are not entirely 
irrational and unpredictable.  Instead, the rationality of real investors is imperfect, 
bounded, and in many ways, predictable.137  Biases,138 heuristics,139 framing ef-
fects,140 and other cognitive stimuli that result in suboptimal decisions affect the 
  
are “rational” decisionmakers have articulated highly sophisticated models that purport to make 
predictions of great exactitude.  In the real world, of course, people are not rational decisionmakers, 
and the economists’ models suffer accordingly.”); Lin, supra note 127, at 336–49 (highlighting dif-
ferences between rational actors and real individuals). 
135. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi, Misunderstanding Ability, Misallocating Responsibility, in THINKING AND 
SEEING: VISUAL METACOGNITION IN ADULTS AND CHILDREN 251, 252 (Daniel T. Levin 
ed., 2004) (comparing the reasonable person to “a kind of superhero” because of her superior 
cognitive abilities relative to lay people); Erwann Michel-Kerjan & Paul Slovic, An Idea Whose Time 
Has Come, in THE IRRATIONAL ECONOMIST: MAKING DECISIONS IN A DANGEROUS 
WORLD 1, 3–7 (Erwann Michel-Kerjan & Paul Slovic eds., 2010). 
136. See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 377–85 (2011); Paul J.H. 
Schoemaker, A Two-Edged Sword: Implications of Decision Psychology for Decision Analysis, in THE 
IRRATIONAL ECONOMIST, supra note 135, at 53, 57–59. 
137. See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR 
DECISIONS 239 (2008) (“Our irrational behaviors are neither random nor senseless—they are sys-
tematic and predictable.”); Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 
56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2003) (“These [cognitive] biases are not merely isolated quirks, rather, they are 
consistent, deep-rooted, and systematic behavioral patterns.”); Jolls et al., supra note 133, at 1475 
(“Behavioral economics does not suggest that behavior is random or impossible to predict; rather it 
suggests, with economics, that behavior is systematic and can be modeled.”). 
138. See Margit E. Oswald & Stefan Grosjean, Confirmation Bias, in COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS: A 
HANDBOOK ON FALLACIES AND BIASES IN THINKING, JUDGEMENT AND MEMORY 79 
(Rüdiger F. Pohl ed., 2004) (explaining the confirmation bias); Lin, supra note 127, at 340–44 
(surveying various cognitive biases); William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in 
Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 7–10 (1988) (discussing the status quo bias); 
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model, 
106 Q.J. ECON. 1039, 1040–42 (1991) (studying the loss aversion bias). 
139. See, e.g., ROY F. BAUMEISTER & BRAD J. BUSHMAN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND HUMAN 
NATURE 161 (2008) (“Mental shortcuts, [or] heuristics, provide quick estimates (though sometimes 
inaccurate ones) for decisions about uncertain events.” (emphasis omitted)); Abhijit V. Banerjee, A 
Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q.J. ECON. 797, 798–800 (1992) (discussing the heuristics of herd 
behavior); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 
185 SCIENCE 1124, 1128–29 (1974) (discussing the anchoring heuristic). 
140. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 
SCIENCE 453, 454–57 (1981) (describing the concept of “framing”). 
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rationality of real investors.  Real investors, for instance, generally possess unhealthy 
surpluses of confidence,141 optimism,142 and loss aversion.143  
Given the cognitive limitations of real investors as compared with the limitless 
cognition of mythical, rational investors, a serious chasm exists between the regula-
tory world and the real world.  Financial regulations crafted primarily for one 
illusive population of rational investors actually govern a significantly distinct pop-
ulation of real investors. 
This mismatch between the reasonable investor and the real investor has 
exhibited itself in prosaic and profound ways.  During the dot-com boom of the 
late 1990s, investors failed to read and heed the warning of securities filings and 
invested in companies based solely on names that suggested technology or internet 
affiliations.144  For example, in 1999, Computer Literacy Inc. changed its name 
to fatbrain.com, and its stock subsequently shot up 33 percent in one day.145  More 
recently, in the years preceding the financial crisis of 2008, overly optimistic in-
vestors purchased homes that they could not afford based on assumptions that were 
not reasonable, like perpetually rising housing prices.146  Similarly, banks made 
loans that they should not have made, and individuals signed mortgages that they 
did not understand; and they collectively caused the housing market to collapse.147 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, many—including some prominent 
free-market apologists—have questioned the utility of the rational actor–investor 
  
141. See Robert J. Shiller, Measuring Bubble Expectations and Investor Confidence, 1 J. PSYCHOL. & FIN. 
MARKETS 49, 50–52 (2000) (studying the impact of investor overconfidence on stock markets). 
142. See David A. Armor & Shelley E. Taylor, When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of Unrealistic Optimism, 
in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 334, 334 (Thomas 
Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (addressing the cognitive bias of overoptimism); Shiller, supra note 141, at 
50–52. 
143. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 137, at 13; Hoffman, supra note 109, at 553. 
144. See JASON ZWEIG, YOUR MONEY AND YOUR BRAIN: HOW THE NEW SCIENCE OF 
NEUROECONOMICS CAN HELP MAKE YOU RICH 8 (2007) (“During 1998 and 1999, one group 
of stocks outperformed the rest of the technology industry by a scorching 63 percentage points—
merely by changing their official corporate names to include .com, .net, or Internet.”). 
145. Id. 
146. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1081–82 (2009) (speculating on the irrationality of lenders, borrowers, 
and homeowners in the years prior to the financial crisis). 
147. See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL 
STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 48–51 (2011) 
[hereinafter LEVIN-COBURN REPORT] (reporting on bad lending process that led to the financial 
crisis); Gerald H. Lander et al., Subprime Mortgage Tremors: An International Issue, 15 INT’L ADVANCES 
ECON. RES. 1, 4 (2009) (“Numerous borrowers say they didn’t understand the loan structure and the 
escalating payments; in many cases, they couldn’t afford them.”); Tom C.W. Lin, Too Big to Fail, Too 
Blind to See, 80 MISS. L.J. 355, 367–71 (2010) (critiquing the rational actor model in connection 
with the financial crisis of 2008). 
The New Investor 699 
 
paradigm.148  Acknowledgment of the incongruence between economics’s rational 
actor and reality’s real individuals has increased, and it is evidenced, in part, by the 
growing prominence of behavioral law and economics.149  Nonetheless, while ef-
forts have been made to craft financial regulations for the irrational investor,150 
most of the regulatory framework continues to exist for the mythical, rational in-
vestor.151 
C. The New Investor 
The resilience of the rational investor paradigm in the face of new evidence 
is both a triumph of ignorance over knowledge as well as a triumph of hope over 
reality.  While new studies continue to highlight the fallacies of equating real in-
vestors to their rational kin, new science and technology also continue to narrow 
the gulf between the irrational investor and the rational investor.152  The narrowing 
of this gulf is giving birth to “the new investor,” an aspirational paradigm with 
positive attributes distinct from previous conceptions of investors. 
First, the new investor is better informed than the irrational investor, or at 
least has better access to better information.  Advances in information technology 
have given modern investors more investment information through more medi-
ums.  Investors today can receive high-quality, user-friendly investment infor-
mation through television, radio, satellite radio, websites, social media tools, 
smartphone applications, and other fora, customized to each investor’s interests 
regardless of their wealth or connections.153  Information technology advances 
have moved the new investor beyond the insular, segmented information exchanges 
  
148. See, e.g., The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 46 (2008) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Former Chairman 
of the Fed. Reserve Board) (acknowledging that he “found a flaw in the [neoclassical] model that . . . de-
fines how the world works”); Richard A. Posner, How I Became a Keynesian, NEW REPUBLIC, 
Sept. 23, 2009, at 34. 
149. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Administrative Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 953, 
958 (1997); Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2, 37 n.149 (2005); Brooks, 
supra note 132 (noting the proliferation of behavioral research). 
150. See, e.g., Ron Lieber, Consumer Watchdog Is All Ears for Ideas, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2011, at B1. 
151. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1987). 
152. See, e.g., RAY KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR: WHEN HUMANS TRANSCEND 
BIOLOGY 1–5 (2005) (discussing the ability of humans to expand their limitations through science 
and technology). 
153. See Patricia Sánchez Abril, The Evolution of Business Celebrity in American Law and Society, 48 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 177, 178 (2011) (“Over the past half-century, digital communications, globalization, mass-
market media and advertising, and a heightened public interest in business matters have conspired 
to shine a brighter spotlight on business leaders as stars.”); Tom C.W. Lin, Undressing the CEO: 
Disclosing Private, Material Matters of Public Company Executives, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 383, 389–92 
(2009) (discussing the increase in media for business information). 
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of its predecessors, toward a more egalitarian form of information exchange.  Today, 
any individual with online access can find and review every public company’s filings 
with the SEC. 
Second, the new investor is faster than its predecessors and continues to ac-
celerate with technological progress.154  Over the last century, financial technology 
evolved from couriers, to ponies, to tickers, to telegrams, to telephones, to com-
puters, and most recently to supercomputers.155  As a result, the new investor is 
capable of investing and trading faster than any of its predecessors and can do so 
from nearly any place on the globe.156  This enhanced velocity has shortened the 
timeline of finance from days to hours, to minutes, to seconds, to nanoseconds.157  
The accelerated velocity means not only faster trade executions but also faster in-
vestment turnovers.  “At the end of World War II, the average holding period for 
a stock was four years.  By 2000, it was eight months.  By 2008, it was two months.  
And by 2011 it was twenty-two seconds . . . .”158 
Third, compared to previous paradigms, the new investor is more capable 
of better investment diversification.  If investment diversification is a hallmark of 
sound investing,159 the new investor is better equipped than its predecessors are in 
this regard.  The new investor can invest in bonds, stocks, and commodities like its 
predecessors.  Unlike its predecessors, however, the new investor can also readily 
invest in more exotic investments like foreign currencies, exchange-traded funds, 
options, and swaps.160  Access to such diverse assets, in theory, allows the new inves-
tor to spread its risks across various types of investments. 
  
154. See KEN AULETTA, GOOGLED: THE END OF THE WORLD AS WE KNOW IT 15 (2009) (“It 
took telephones seventy-one years to penetrate 50 percent of American homes, electricity fifty-two 
years, and TV three decades.  The Internet reached more than 50 percent of Americans in a mere 
decade[, and] . . . Facebook built up a community of two hundred million users in just five years.”). 
155. See LABOR STATISTICS BUREAU, CAREER GUIDE TO INDUSTRIES 2008–2009, at 188 (2008) 
(“The securities industry is continuously changing because of improvements in technology . . . .”). 
156. See Haldane, supra note 14, at 5 (discussing how modern financiers continue to break new frontiers in 
execution speed for their investments and trades). 
157. See Graham Bowley, The New Speed of Money, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2011, at BU1 (reporting on the 
astounding velocity of modern finance). 
158. PATTERSON, supra note 65, at 46. 
159. See IAN AYRES & BARRY NALEBUFF, LIFECYCLE INVESTING: A NEW, SAFE, AND AUDACIOUS 
WAY TO IMPROVE THE PERFORMANCE OF YOUR RETIREMENT PORTFOLIO 1–3 (2010) 
(analyzing the importance of asset and time diversification in investing); GARY BELSKY & THOMAS 
GILOVICH, WHY SMART PEOPLE MAKE BIG MONEY MISTAKES—AND HOW TO CORRECT 
THEM: LESSONS FROM THE NEW SCIENCE OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 250–51 (2010) 
(highlighting the benefits of diversification in investments).  But see GERALD M. LOEB, THE 
BATTLE FOR INVESTMENT SURVIVAL 103–04 (John Wiley & Sons 2007) (1935) (espousing the 
virtues of concentrated investments over diversified investments). 
160. See, e.g., Houman B. Shadab, Fending for Themselves: Creating a U.S. Hedge Fund Market for Retail 
Investors, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 251, 277 (2008) (“Finally, with the development of 
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Fourth, relative to the irrational investor, the new investor is less emotional 
and more rational.  The new investor is more self-aware of its personal and psy-
chological pitfalls, and more capable of tempering its emotional and irrational 
impulses.161  Recent studies in behavioral finance and psychology have made the 
new investor more mindful of its cognitive vulnerabilities.162  Such awareness, in 
turn, has led to the creation of new investment tools to help the new investor allo-
cate its assets more rationally.163  For example, the new investor frequently trades 
using computer models and mathematical algorithms, which are more impervious 
to the irrational cognitive whims of market players.164  Dispassionate computerized 
analysis mitigates the arbitrariness of fear and greed that often motivate inves-
tors.165  Computers running “statistical regressions don’t have egos or feelings,”166 
and they are not prone to overconfidence.167  While these tools dominate the upper 
echelons of finance,168 they also exist outside high finance.  Free and inexpensive 
tools allow pedestrian investors to better evaluate the risk and diversity of their in-
vestments.  For instance, online brokers such as Charles Schwab and E-Trade 
have user-friendly tools that help investors assess the risks and balance of their 
  
sophisticated at-home trading tools and publicly registered exchange traded funds (ETFs), retail 
investors can implement hedge fund trading strategies on their own, at low cost.”). 
161. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2009) (discussing many circumstances in which 
individuals and institutions can create choice architectures that better protect them from their 
cognitive limitations); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an 
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003) (finding that individuals are slow to join 401(k) plans 
that offer more choices because they are prone to procrastination). 
162. See Posner, supra note 149, at 958 (alluding to the proliferation of behavioral economics scholarship); 
Subramanian, supra note 149, at 37 n.149; see also KAHNEMAN, supra note 136, at 377–97. 
163. See BELSKY & GILOVICH, supra note 159, at 207–11 (advising on various methods to improve 
financial decisions based on the science of behavioral economics); Donald C. Langevoort, Selling 
Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law From Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated 
Customers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 627, 635 (1996); Lin, supra note 127, at 356–63 (discussing various 
ways to improve federal securities disclosures based on insights from behavioral economics); Troy A. 
Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 
2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 1026 (espousing default rules to enhance financial regulation); David H. 
Freedman, The Perfected Self, ATLANTIC, June 2012, at 42. 
164. MONKS & LAJOUX, supra note 72, at 229 (“The goal of algorithmic trading is to take the human 
factor out of trading as much as possible to avoid the irrational aspects of fear (economic panics) and 
greed (irrational exuberance).”). 
165. NARANG, supra note 99, at xii. 
166. AYRES, supra note 38, at 115. 
167. See, e.g., Tom C.W. Lin, The Corporate Governance of Iconic Executives, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
351, 373–76 (2011) (describing the perils of overconfidence in business decisions). 
168. See Joe Nocera, Risk Management, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 4, 2009, at 24 (discussing the wide use of 
the Value at Risk model by investment banks to manage risk). 
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portfolios.169  In the future, advances in transcranial magnetic stimulation tech-
nology may permit the brain to be reprogrammed to make better financial deci-
sions.170  While new awareness and corresponding developments help make the 
new investor more rational, they do not make it completely impervious to all of its 
cognitive quirks and limitations.  Investors will continue to make mistakes,171 but 
they now have better tools to correct and prevent them.172 
Fifth, compared to the other models, the new investor is more humble about 
its capabilities and knowledge.  While the new investor possesses more knowledge 
and investing capabilities relative to its predecessors, the new investor is also more 
mindful of its limitations, the limitations of models, and the limitations of technolo-
gy.173  The new investor is more aware of the role of randomness, serendipity, and 
uncertainty in life and finance.174  The new investor has a vast library of data and in-
formation but also has a vast antilibrary175: a collection of known unknowns and 
unknown unknowns; a repository of unlearned knowledge.176  The antilibrary 
tempers the new investor’s confidence in its capabilities and knowledge as it relates 
to financial markets. 
In sum, the aspirational new investor is a modest cyborg.177  When famed 
finance professor Benjamin Graham published his landmark book, The Intelligent 
  
169. See ANN C. LOGUE, DAY TRADING FOR DUMMIES 195 (2d ed. 2011) (describing the numer-
ous investment tools and services available to clients of Charles Schwab); E-trade, E-trade Baby 
Girlfriend Super Bowl Commercial 2010, YOUTUBE (Feb. 7, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch? 
v=tbLTl7egwlU. 
170. See Sharon Begley With Jean Chatzky, Stop! You Can’t Afford It, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 7 & 14, 2011, 
at 50. 
171. See, e.g., BELSKY & GILOVICH, supra note 159, at 151–53 (acknowledging that awareness of one’s 
cognitive limitations does not necessarily mean that one will perfectly correct them). 
172. Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349, 1410–11 (2011) 
(discussing the use of empirical findings about human behavior in crafting better regulations). 
173. See, e.g., EMANUEL DERMAN & PAUL WILMOTT, THE FINANCIAL MODELERS’ MANIFESTO 
1 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1324878 (“Our experience 
in the financial arena has taught us to be very humble in applying mathematics to markets, and to be 
extremely wary of ambitious theories, which are in the end trying to model human behavior.  We 
like simplicity, but we like to remember that it is our models that are simple, not the world.”). 
174. See, e.g., LEONARD MLODINOW, THE DRUNKARD’S WALK: HOW RANDOMNESS RULES OUR 
LIVES 216–18 (2008) (expounding on the role of randomness in life and markets). 
175. NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE 
1 (2d ed. 2010) (introducing the term “antilibrary” as a collection of knowledge that one does not yet 
possess). 
176. The terms “known unknowns” and “unknown unknowns” were popularized by former Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld.  See Donald H. Rumsfeld, Sec’y of Def., Remarks at Department of Defense 
News Briefing (Feb. 12, 2002), available at http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx? 
TranscriptID=2636. 
177. See Donna J. Haraway, A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late 
Twentieth Century, in READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY 161, 161 (David M. 
Kaplan ed., 2004) (“A cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature 
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Investor, in 1973, it is unlikely that he envisioned his title character would be a cy-
borg, but modernity has made it so.178  The new investor is in many ways Graham’s 
intelligent investor modernized, and it is neither wholly human nor wholly ma-
chine.  Instead, it is the hybrid offspring of both human and machine.  In fact, 
Sherry Turkle, a leading sociologist, and others have declared that, “We are all 
cyborgs now.”179  And because we are all cyborgs, we all hold the promise and po-
tential of becoming a better investor—of becoming the new investor. 
 
* * * 
 
New science and technology have precipitated a conceptual evolution of the 
investor from the reasonable investor to the irrational investor to the new investor.  
While the reasonable investor model remains statically and theoretically domi-
nant, regulators need to become more mindful of the dynamism and realism of the 
new investor model if they hope to remain relevant. 
III. CLEAR, PRESENT, AND FUTURE DANGERS 
The new investor offers the promise of smarter, faster, and better results, 
but this paradigm also poses new challenges and dangers from within and without.  
The enhanced speed and interconnectedness of cyborg finance makes it more en-
dogenously vulnerable to volatile crashes, and the heavy reliance on machines makes 
the system more exogenously vulnerable to cyber perils. 
A. The Flash Crash and Future Crashes 
On May 6, 2010, the perils of cyborg finance became clear.  On that day, the 
world witnessed a crash and recovery of spectacular volatility and velocity in the U.S. 
  
of social reality as well as a creature of fiction.”); Peter Norberg, Trading Trust: Post-aristocratic Finance 
in the City of Stockholm 11 (SSE/EFI Working Paper in Bus. Admin. No. 2009:8, 2009), available at 
http://swoba.hhs.se/hastba/papers/hastba2009_008.pdf (“Fused with algorithms, hybrid cyborg 
investors occupied with trading online take the place of simple human beings.”). 
178. See BENJAMIN GRAHAM, THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR: A BOOK OF PRACTICAL COUNSEL 
(4th rev. ed. 1973) (providing a guide to becoming an intelligent investor—one that is thoughtful, 
rational, and value driven). 
179. See TURKLE, supra note 32, at 152; see also David J. Hess, On Low-Tech Cyborgs, in THE CYBORG 
HANDBOOK 371, 373 (Chris Hables Gray ed., 1995) (“[A]lmost everyone in urban societies could 
be seen as a low-tech cyborg, because they spend large parts of the day connected to machines such as 
cars, telephones, computers, and, of course, televisions.”); Amber Case, We Are All Cyborgs Now, 
TED.COM (Jan. 2011), http://www.ted.com/talks/amber_case_we_are_all_cyborgs_now.html. 
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stock market.180  In less than thirty minutes, approximately $1 trillion in market val-
ue vanished.181  The events of that day are now known simply as the Flash Crash.182 
The Flash Crash occurred on a day when the markets opened with concerns 
about an ongoing European debt crisis.183  At approximately 2:32 p.m., with an 
automated computer program, a Kansas mutual fund company initiated a trade to 
sell $4.1 billion of E-Mini S&P futures contracts.184  The sale was executed via a 
high-speed computerized algorithm that was programmed to execute the trade 
“without regard to price or time.”185  The program completed the sale in merely 
twenty minutes.186  A sale of this value would normally take several hours or days 
to complete in years past.187  
The execution of this trade led to corresponding trades in the futures and 
equity markets.  Seconds after the completion of the $4.1 billion sale, other black 
box programs began selling large blocks of S&P futures, accounting for over 33 
percent of the total trading volume.188  Between 2:41 p.m. and 2:44 p.m., S&P fu-
tures dropped by approximately 3 percent.  By 2:42 p.m., the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average (Dow) had declined 3.9 percent to 10,445.85.  At 2:45:28 p.m., the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange’s curbs were triggered, pausing the sale of S&P futures for a 
few seconds to slow the freefall in price.189  When trading resumed at 2:45:33 p.m., 
the S&P futures gradually began to stabilize and recover.190  The Dow, however, 
continued to decline, dropping to 9872.57, or a 9.16 percent drop from the previ-
ous day’s close, before recovering nearly all of the decline by 3:00 p.m.191  During 
the Dow’s precipitous drop, the share prices of blue-chip stocks like Proctor & 
Gamble and 3M experienced losses exceeding 18 percent, wiping out billions of 
dollars in shareholder wealth in a few minutes.192  “Peak to trough, Accenture 
shares fell by over 99%, from $40 to $0.01.  At precisely the same time, shares in 
Sotheby’s rose three thousand–fold, from $34 to $99,999.99.”193  At the end of the 
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trading day, “major futures and equities indices ‘recovered’ to close at losses of 
about 3% from the prior day.”194 
Following the Flash Crash, the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) commenced inquiries on the events of that day and took 
steps to mitigate the damage from similar episodes in the future.  Unsurprisingly, 
the inquiry showed that the volatility and declines of the Dow during the Flash 
Crash mirrored volatility and declines of the S&P 500 futures.195  The inquiry, 
however, did not blame the Flash Crash entirely on black box traders but rather 
acknowledged that such traders played a critical role in eroding liquidity and exac-
erbating volatility.196 
In response to the Flash Crash, the SEC shortly thereafter implemented a 
new circuit breaker program to pause trading for five minutes once a security has 
experienced a 10 percent price change over the preceding five minutes.197  The 
purpose of circuit breakers is to serve as speed bumps during periods of extreme 
volatility that may induce more volatility and destabilization in the marketplace.  
The SEC approved this circuit breaker on June 10, 2010, for the S&P 500.198  
On September 10, 2010, the SEC expanded the circuit breaker to include the 
Russell 1000 Index and certain exchange traded funds.199  The SEC also proposed 
a “consolidated audit trail” rule to make it easier for regulators to monitor and 
track the happenings of the complex securities execution system.200  The SEC 
and the CFTC also planned further studies and actions on black box trading.201 
While no other crash matching the magnitude of the Flash Crash has oc-
curred since May 6, 2010, there have been several minicrashes and disruptions.202  
On September 27, 2010, Progress Energy’s stock plunged almost 90 percent, fall-
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195. Id at 3.  
196. See id. at 6. 
197. Id. at 7. 
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200. See Consolidated Audit Trail, 75 Fed. Reg. 32,556 (proposed June 8, 2010) (to be codified at 17 
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201. See CFTC & SEC FINDINGS, supra note 19, at 6–8.  In September 2011, the SEC proposed addi-
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(proposed Sept. 28, 2011). 
202. See Graham Bowley, The Flash Crash, in Miniature, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2010, at B1 (“The crashes 
continue even as Washington regulators investigate the structure of modern markets and as a re-
port traced the main trigger of May’s big crash to a poorly timed trade by a mutual fund in Kansas.”); 
Edward E. Kaufman, Jr. & Carl M. Levin, Preventing the Next Flash Crash, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 
2011, at A27 (discussing minicrashes since the Flash Crash). 
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ing from $44.57 per share to $4.57 per share in a matter of minutes.203  The circuit 
breakers instituted by the SEC were set off, but the plunge occurred so quickly 
that the stock price continued to fall on the NASDAQ.204  After numerous trades 
were voided, it was determined that the faulty trades were a mistake; an errant exe-
cution of a computer algorithm was to blame for the loss and recovery of millions 
of dollars in market capitalization.205  Several months later, on May 13, 2011, the 
stock of Enstar, a natural gas company, fell from $100 to $0 and then bounced 
back to $100; Focus Morningstar Health Card Index opened at $25.32 then fell to 
$0.06, before recovering, due in large part to black box trading.206  Then in March 
2012, the initial public offering of BATS Global Markets, an electronic stock 
exchange pioneer, had to be withdrawn after major technical difficulties caused 
serious volatility and confusion in its first hours of trading.207  Later in 2012, the mar-
kets again experienced instability caused by computerized trading with Facebook’s 
initial public offering in May and a rogue computer program related to Knight 
Trading in August.208 
While no other major crash has occurred since the Flash Crash, experts and 
regulators fear that it is only a matter of time before the “Big One.”209  And in the 
interim, smaller market disruptions have grown and will likely continue to grow 
more prevalent as cy-fi advances and proliferates.210 
B. Cybercrimes and Cyberthreats 
In the age of cyborg finance, financial institutions have to guard against new 
and emerging threats relating to cyberspace and intellectual property.211  Computer 
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codes and platforms are some of the most valuable and the most vulnerable assets 
of many firms, particularly financial firms.212  With cy-fi, safeguarding trade secrets, 
intellectual property, and the integrity of proprietary systems is the key to sus-
tainable success for many financial institutions and financial systems.213  Serious 
crimes and threats against financial institutions now often involve computers as the 
weapon of choice, intellectual property as their targeted bounty, and cyberspace as 
their default setting.214  In 2008, the Conficker worm, a malicious software program 
with unknown origins, “infected 1.5 million computers in 195 countries.”215  In 
2009, a former Goldman Sachs computer programmer was arrested and initially 
sentenced to more than eight years in prison for stealing computer codes used in 
Goldman Sachs’s algorithmic trading platforms.216  In 2011, hackers affiliated with 
WikiLeaks threatened to release sensitive information relating to Bank of America, 
sending its shares down significantly.217  In 2012, the U.S. Department of Labor 
enhanced the security of its economic data in response to hacking threats aimed 
at benefitting high-speed traders.218  That same year, the world also witnessed two 
large coordinated attacks, one against global financial institutions of every class 
and type, called “Operation High Roller,” and another one specifically targeting 
American banks; some of these attacks have been attributed to Iran.219  By some 
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accounts, cybercrime costs the United States an estimated $400 billion annually.220  
Because of the borderless and anonymous nature of cyberspace, cyberattacks are 
difficult to trace ex post and difficult to prevent ex ante.221 
All industries are susceptible to cybercrimes and cyberthreats, but the modern 
financial industry is particularly vulnerable because of its heavy reliance on com-
puterized systems to store information, analyze data, and allocate capital.222  The 
modern financial industry is essentially a high-tech industry in which computer 
codes and computer networks are at the heart of its very existence.  This vulnerabil-
ity is magnified by the fact that once established, many of these systems are self-
executing and devoid of human control.  Attackers could trigger a crash by injecting 
the system with bad data and fake trades.223  The impact of such a cyberattack on the 
financial system would be economically crippling and confidence shattering.224 
In the age of cy-fi, firms and governments have to safeguard their interests 
from an expanding cast of elusive antagonists including their employees, compet-
itors, rogue hackers, and even other nation-states.225  A recent study indicated 
that cyberattacks—that may have been state sponsored—were specifically targeting 
American corporations.226  Given the importance of the American financial indus-
try, cyberattacks on our financial institutions make much strategic sense for those 
who seek to harm American interests. 
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While it may appear far-fetched to believe that the prominent theater of future 
warfare is cyberspace,227 reality is not too far off.228  In 2007, during a dispute with 
Russia, Estonia experienced a massive cyberattack on its cyberinfrastructure, which 
some attributed to Russia, making it difficult for Estonians to engage in any online 
activities.229  A few years later in 2011, it was widely believed that coordinated 
cyberattacks by Israel and the United States caused a serious blow to Iran’s nuclear 
weapons program.230  The initial weapon of choice in a 2011 attack was Stuxnet, 
a computer virus superworm, deemed by some as “the most sophisticated 
cyberweapon ever deployed.”231  A year later, it was reported that another com-
puter super virus called the Flame—which some again attributed to the United 
States and Israel—was “afflicting computers in Iran and the Middle East.”232  
That same year, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, warned that the 
United States was facing a potential “cyber–Pearl Harbor.”233  Furthermore, experts 
suspect that China has long engaged in cyberwarfare and cyberespionage against 
American interests and businesses for many years.234 
In response to the emerging threat of cyberwarfare, the federal government 
has taken notice.  In 2011, recognizing the burgeoning importance of cybersecurity 
to commerce, the SEC for the first time issued disclosure guidance relating to 
cybersecurity as a business risk that could materially affect firms.235  That same 
year, the White House and the Department of Defense published a number of 
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white papers,236 including the latter’s first strategic statement for cyberspace.237  
Additionally, the Pentagon has aggressively accelerated its cyberwarfare programs 
in recent years.238  As of 2012, the Air Force alone spends approximately $4 billion 
annually on its cyberprograms.239 
While the perils posed by cybercrimes and cyberthreats are many, serious, 
and real,240 they should not be overblown, nor should they lead to rash overreac-
tions.241  Attempts at cybersecurity should not inhibit the “generativity” of infor-
mation technology and finance.242  Cybersecurity prevention and protection efforts 
are undoubtedly difficult,243 but they must also be sensible, thoughtful, and not 
obstruct the promise and progress of cyborg finance.244  This will, undoubtedly, be 
a difficult endeavor, given the amorphous and evolving nature of cyberspace, its 
technologies, and its threats.  However, it is an endeavor that must be pursued vig-
orously because, ultimately, technological advances in finance may hold more 
promise than threat in the future. 
IV. EMERGING IMPLICATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES 
The transformation of modern finance into cyborg finance contains numer-
ous implications and consequences.  Some have emerged, others are emerging, 
and many remain unknown.  That said, three meaningful, budding, and underap-
preciated outgrowths of this ongoing financial transformation relate to (1) sys-
temic risks involving increased financial speed and connectivity, (2) law’s capacity 
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to adapt itself to this transformation, and (3) critical resource asymmetries within 
the financial industry spurred by this transformation. 
A. Of Speed and Links 
Modern finance has produced great opportunities for wealth creation and 
societal progress by providing capital and financing for the new developments of 
businesses and governments, but it has also produced profound challenges for eco-
nomic stability and social welfare in the form of new systemic risks.245  Regulators 
have paid much attention to the systemic risk of “too big to fail” in recent years, 
and rightfully so.246  “Too big to fail” describes a deleterious systemic risk of modern 
finance in which financial institutions grow too large and too important to the eco-
nomy for them to falter, such that the government has to rescue these private 
businesses with public funds.247  As modern finance transforms into cyborg finance, 
two new deleterious systemic risks have arisen: one related to velocity, which this 
Article terms “too fast to save,” and the other related to connectivity, which this Article 
terms “too linked to fail.” 
1. Too Fast to Save 
Cyborg finance operates at velocities previously unattainable and poses perils 
previously unimaginable.248  Billions of dollars move across borders and oceans 
through cables and spectra at the speed of milliseconds.249  Mere seconds are too 
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slow, and cy-fi does not intend to slow down.250  In 2012, work began on a “$300 
million transatlantic fiber-optic line called Project Express” aimed at reducing 
trade execution times by a mere five milliseconds.251  The new frontiers of financial 
speed are nanoseconds (billionths of a second) and picoseconds (trillionths of a 
second).252  Such velocities can create problems of “too fast to save” relating to the 
underlying components of cyborg finance: computers and humans. 
In terms of computers, the accelerated speed of transactions in and of itself 
can increase the error rate and the utilization of bad data by automated computer 
programs before remedial measures can be taken.253  Popular author Tom Clancy 
described a nightmare scenario in his novel Debt of Honor, in which falsified data 
are intentionally injected into the securities markets causing global financial chaos 
as automated programs instantaneously reacted to the bad information before it 
could be detected.254  While that nightmare scenario, to the best of our knowledge, 
has not yet materialized, smaller malfeasances may have already occurred.255  During 
the financial crisis of 2008, many blamed short sellers for injecting misinforma-
tion into the market to create profitable positions for themselves by driving down 
the price of financial stocks with false rumors during a time of distress.256  The 
problems surrounding automated programs reacting to bad data likely will persist 
and grow as reliance on black box programs increases in finance. 
Beyond computers, humans can also trigger serious problems that are “too 
fast to save.”  Today, a single rogue trader or a well-intentioned but misinformed 
trader can now cause catastrophic damage to a financial institution or the entire sys-
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tem with just a few clicks before anyone can intervene.  In 2008, a trader at the 
French investment bank Societe Generale nearly destroyed the storied firm with 
$69 billion in unauthorized positions.257  The unwinding of those trades resulted in 
a $7 billion loss.258  In 2011, another trader at the Swiss investment bank UBS 
caused losses of $2.3 billion.259  While such trades and bad acts could have occurred 
in the analog ages of finance, they would likely have taken much longer to execute 
and required more clearance by more individuals prior to execution.  Today, many 
checks and balances have been sacrificed for velocity and efficiency because of cy-fi’s 
insistence on speed.  This insistence has made it more difficult to catch and prevent 
such bad acts and bad actors. 
While some argue that certain modern financial products are “unsafe at any 
rate,”260 the speed at which many transactions are being executed suggests that 
some products are simply unsafe at high speeds.261  The emphasis on speed in cy-
borg finance has led to more automated trading platforms, more reactive executions, 
less reflective deliberation, and less opportunity for safeguarding: 
For the first time in financial history, machines can execute trades far 
faster than humans can intervene.  That gap is set to widen.  In some 
respects the 2010 Flash Crash and the 1987 stock market crash have 
common genes—algorithmic amplification of stress.  But they differ in 
one critical respect.  Regulatory intervention could feasibly have forestalled 
the 1987 crash.  By the time of the Flash Crash, regulators might have 
blinked—literally, blinked—and missed their chance.262 
Following the Flash Crash, the national exchanges proposed rules for more 
stringent circuit breakers in the event of accelerated market decreases.263  These en-
hanced circuit breakers were intended to serve as speed bumps for a market in de-
scent.  While they may prove to be helpful, they nonetheless do not fully address 
the problems posed by “too fast to save,” as trading in less regulated dark pools and 
electronic markets without circuit breakers will continue to grow,264 and hyperspeed 
trades with detrimental consequences may not timely trigger the proposed breakers.  
  
257. Nicola Clark, Rogue Trader at Société Générale Gets 3 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2010, at B1. 
258. Id. 
259. See Julia Werdigier, Revealing Details of Rogue Trades, UBS Raises Loss Estimate to $2.3 Billion, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2011, at B3. 
260. Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY J., Summer 2007, at 8. 
261. Frank Partnoy, Don’t Blink: Snap Decisions and Securities Regulation, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 151, 155 
(2011) (espousing the virtues of slower speeds in financial markets). 
262. Haldane, supra note 14, at 15. 
263. See, e.g., Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Update Rule 6121 and Amend Rule 6440, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-65,430, 76 Fed. Reg. 61,429 (Oct. 4, 2011). 
264. It should likely not be shocking to industry insiders and learned observers if in the near future dark 
pools and electronic markets become the dominant space of trading for all investors. 
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The future speed of finance, undoubtedly, will become faster, and too fast to save 
will be one of the greatest regulatory challenges for regulators and policymakers in 
the coming years. 
2. Too Linked to Fail 
Modern finance exists as an expansive, interconnected network that crosses 
institutions, industries, states, and products—creating a systemic problem that 
this Article terms “too linked to fail.”  In the age of cy-fi, commercial banks, in-
vestment banks, hedge funds, mutual funds, pension funds, private equity firms, 
nation-states, wealthy traders, and a host of other players and institutions are all 
bounded together as part of this growing financial web of mutuality.  And within 
the mesh of that financial web are financial products that have also grown more 
linked to one another. 
The connectedness of cyborg finance has enhanced the mobility of capital 
and dispersed certain risks.265  Despite its many positive externalities, however, 
cyborg finance’s connectedness has also created new challenges and magnified old 
ones.266  Whereas in eras past the failure of one financial institution, one sovereign 
treasury, or one financial product was largely and better contained by geography, 
cyborg finance has obliterated all borders and boundaries.  The financial problems 
of one nation-state can now affect all nation-states like never before.267  The de-
mise of one financial institution can now affect many financial institutions.268  
The mistake of one trader can now cause catastrophic consequences for entire mar-
ket segments.  The volatility of one financial product can now ripple across many  
  
265. See, e.g., Jamie Morgan, How Reality Ate Itself: Orthodoxy, Economy and Trust, in REAL WORLD 
ECONOMICS: A POST-AUTISTIC ECONOMICS READER 105, 107 (Edward Fullbrook ed., 2006) 
(discussing policy commentary on opportunities for financial risk dispersion as a result of new tech-
nology). 
266. See Serritella, supra note 73, at 437 (noting the potential perils resulting from “the interconnectivity 
of financial markets and their participants, as well as increased interconnections between securities and 
their derivatives”). 
267. See, e.g., Robert W. Kolb, Introduction, in FINANCIAL CONTAGION: THE VIRAL THREAT TO THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS, at xiii (Robert W. Kolb ed., 2011) (“Similarly, financial distress in one 
nation can affect another . . . .”). 
268. ROBERT W. KOLB, LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND 
OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE 128 (2010) (“The failure of just one large financial institution might 
lead to the failure of one or more other institutions that would then spread to yet more financial 
institutions in a contagion that was feared might end in the collapse of the entire financial system.”). 
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financial products.269  This may be the case not only for too-big-to-fail firms, which 
have received most of the regulatory attention,270 but also for smaller firms, finan-
cial intermediaries, and financial products that are simply “too linked to fail” because 
their failure may unravel other institutions that are bound to it as part of the mod-
ern financial network.  In 1998, Long-Term Capital Management, a hedge fund 
located in Greenwich, Connecticut, with less than two hundred employees caused 
serious panic on Wall Street when several of its positions turned sour as a result of the 
financial crises in Asia and Russia.271  To prevent significant losses for several invest-
ment banks and to stem wider panic on Wall Street, the Federal Reserve orches-
trated a $3.6 billion industry-led bailout for Long-Term Capital Management.272 
More than a decade later, investors continue to witness the mutating problems 
of “too linked to fail” with greater magnitude as financial problems and financial 
products of individual institutions and sovereign states, oceans away, affect the 
U.S. financial system, and vice versa.  The demise of Bear Stearns and the bank-
ruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008273 sent destructive waves through the global 
financial system.274  The potential failure in 2008 of credit default swaps conceived 
by an American International Group (AIG) subsidiary in London and bought by 
all the major investment banks was at the crux of the financial crisis.275  In 2011 
and 2012, problems relating to the sovereign debt of Greece, Italy, and Spain cre-
ated significant economic stresses for America, China, Europe, and much of the 
developed world.276  In 1944, President Franklin D. Roosevelt made the following 
statement that rings truer today than it did then: “Economic diseases are highly  
 
 
  
269. See Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic 
Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 659 (2012) (arguing that new financial products born of the shadow 
banking system create new sources of systemic risk). 
270. See, e.g., Authority to Designate Financial Market Utilities as Systemically Important, 76 Fed. Reg. 
44,763, 44,765 (July 27, 2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1320 (2012)) (correlating systemic impor-
tance largely based on monetary value). 
271. See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM 
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, at xviii–xx (2000). 
272. See FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 261 (2003). 
273. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill Is Sold, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, 
at A1. 
274. See Bryan Burrough, Bringing Down Bear Stearns, VANITY FAIR, Aug. 2008, http://www.vanity 
fair.com/politics/features/2008/08/bear_stearns200808. 
275. SORKIN, supra note 247, at 394–400. 
276. See Clive Cook, Who Lost the Euro, BUS. WK., May 28, 2012, at 9, 10–12; Peter Coy, Greece: Why 
the Beast Is Back, BUS. WK., May 30, 2011, at 10, 10–11; Carol Matlack & Jeff Black, Exit the Euro 
Zone? Think Before You Leap, BUS. WK., Sept. 19, 2011, at 15. 
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communicable.  It follows, therefore, that the economic health of every country is 
a proper matter of concern to all its neighbors, near and distant.”277 
Like a vast alignment of dominoes of all shapes and sizes, the demise of one 
institution or one instrument can send ripples through all and cause many to falter 
and many to fall.278  These effects are compounded by a factor of many multiples 
when players engage in similar strategies and algorithms.279  This mass mimicry 
can lead to a “crowded trade” phenomenon in which a few trades lead to a cascade 
of trades as spillover effects and feedback loops effectuated by automated programs 
that permeate the financial system.280  Because of the growing number of linked 
participants and linked products within the modern financial network, these ripples 
could become more frequent, thereby leading to increased volatility in the mar-
ketplace.281 
 
* * * 
 
The combination of enhanced velocity and connectivity in cyborg finance 
poses profound dangers for investors and society as more financial actors and ac-
tions become too fast to save and too linked to fail.  Many experts have predicted 
that as computerized trading expands deeper into foreign markets the next financial 
crash could be quicker and more pervasive than any previously witnessed.282  Har-
nessing the power of cy-fi’s speed and linkage while managing its risks will be a 
critical challenge for financial regulators in the coming years.283 
  
277. HANS KELSEN, COLLECTIVE SECURITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 257 (Lawbook Exchange 
Ltd. 2001) (1954) (quoting Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address to the Monetary and Fin. Conference, 
Washington, D.C. (June 29, 1944)). 
278. Bernard S. Donefer, Algos Gone Wild: Risk in the World of Automated Trading Strategies, J. TRADING, 
Spring 2010, at 31. 
279. See Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-61,358, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 3594, 3611 (proposed Jan. 21, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242) (“[M]any proprietary 
firms potentially could engage in similar or connected trading strategies that, if such strategies gen-
erated significant losses at the same time, could cause many proprietary firms to become financially 
distressed and lead to large fluctuations in market prices.”). 
280. See BROWN, supra note 59, at 7. 
281. See PATTERSON, supra note 65, at 9 (discussing the financial dangers of “a vicious self-reinforcing 
feedback loop”); Louise Story & Graham Bowley, Market Swings Are Becoming New Standard, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2011, at A1. 
282. See, e.g., Kaufman & Levin, supra note 202; Jim McTague, Next Danger: “Splash Crash,” BARRON’S 
(May 21, 2011), http://online.barrons.com/article/SB5000142405297020386980457632739160 
3772726.html (reporting on the possibility of a global “widespread and catastrophic” crash across asset 
classes and markets caused by high-speed trading computers). 
283. Jason Zweig, Could Computers Protect the Market From Computers, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2012, at B1. 
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B. Of Laws and Rules 
Law constantly plays tortoise to finance’s hare.  Technological and market 
innovations in finance often bound ahead of laws and regulations.284  Developments 
in finance over the last three decades exemplify this Aesopian dynamic as financial 
innovation outpaced the rules and laws designed to govern financial markets.285  
In some instances, innovations were designed to skirt existing regulations and regu-
lators.286  In other instances, the reactive, yet tedious slog of rulemaking was 
simply no match for the swiftness of financial and technological innovation.287  
And in some instances, regulations inadvertently sowed the seeds of financial risk 
and peril.288  The computerization of finance over the last few decades has en-
hanced the specter of law’s inadequacy over financial innovation, which can be 
traced to matters of jurisdiction and origination, among others.289 
On matters of jurisdiction, law is bounded by sovereign and regulatory bor-
ders,290 but cyborg finance knows no borders.291  Technology has made the in-
  
284. See INSA, supra note 225, at 6 (“National and international laws, regulations, and enforcement are 
still struggling to catch up to cyber activities worldwide.”); Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: 
The Law’s Race to Keep Up With Technological Change, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 239, 239–41. 
285. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International Money: Regulation in a 
Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1855, 1856–57 (1997) (discussing how globalization 
has increased the burden of capital market regulators to maintain adequate disclosure, antifraud, and 
antimanipulation rules); Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 
1, 2–5 (2010) (noting the lack of regulatory innovation in response to financial innovation); Tara 
Bhupathi, Note, Technology’s Latest Market Manipulator? High Frequency Trading: The Strategies, 
Tools, Risks, and Responses, 11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 377, 377–78 (2010) (“Rapid technological advances 
have . . . caus[ed] the legal world to either choose to judicially adapt old laws and policies to the new 
digital situations or to legislatively create new doctrines to deal with unforeseen challenges.”). 
286. See, e.g., GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. 
MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE 
39–47 (2009) (discussing how the derivatives markets grew by working around existing regulations); 
Charles W. Calomiris, Financial Innovation, Regulation, and Reform, 29 CATO J. 65, 65 (2009) 
(explaining how financial innovation is often born out of “sidestepping regulatory restrictions”). 
287. See, e.g., Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, Nonbank Institutions in Financial Sector Reform, in SEQUENCING?: 
FINANCIAL STRATEGIES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 127, 133 (Alison Harwood & Bruce 
L.R. Smith eds., 1997) (discussing how swift financial innovation is frequently met with slow regu-
lation). 
288. See, e.g., Calomiris, supra note 286, at 67–68 (“Risk-taking was driven by government policies; gov-
ernment’s actions were the root problem, not government inaction.”). 
289. See, e.g., Moses, supra note 284, at 239–40 (chronicling incidents in which new technology generated 
new legal questions). 
290. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885 (“Like the United States, foreign countries regulate their domestic 
securities exchanges and securities transactions occurring within their territorial jurisdiction.”). 
291. See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A 
BORDERLESS WORLD, at vii–viii (2006); Johnson & Post, supra note 85, at 1367 (discussing the 
need for new legal conceptions of jurisdiction with the emergence of the internet); Lawrence 
Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1743–45 (1995).  Contra Allan R. Stein, The 
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vestment market a global market with little regard for the jurisdiction of countries 
and regulators.292  In the age of cy-fi, boundaries matter little to financiers but 
matter greatly to regulators.293  This territorial dissonance between regulators and 
the regulated has a large impact on financial governance.  Because of this territorial 
dissonance, financial players are in some cases governed by a multiplicity of unco-
ordinated regulators spanning seas and states with rules that sometimes overlap and 
conflict.294  In other cases, financial players simply operate in a regulatory penum-
bra with little or no governance.295 
This jurisdictionally based patchwork of regulations and regulators allows 
financial players to engage in dangerous games of regulatory arbitrage within and 
across countries.296  Various regulators with complex sets of rules, for example, gov-
ern investment banking operations in the United States and the United Kingdom.297  
Credit-default-swap operations, on the other hand, existed with little to no mean-
ingful government regulation and oversight for many years.298  In the lead up to 
  
Unexceptional Problem of Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 32 INT’L LAW. 1167, 1191 (1998) (arguing that 
jurisdictional issues relating to cyberspace are “not uniquely problematic”). 
292. See BROWN, supra note 59, at 149 (“Advancements in electronic trading technology have rapidly 
accelerated the globalization of equity markets.”). 
293. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“It is a longstanding principle of 
American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’” (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 
281, 285 (1949))). 
294. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885 (“And the [financial] regulation of other countries often differs 
from ours as to what constitutes fraud, what disclosures must be made, what damages are recoverable, 
what discovery is available in litigation, what individual actions may be joined in a single suit, what 
attorney’s fees are recoverable, and many other matters.”). 
295. See, e.g., ALEXANDER DAVIDSON, HOW THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS REALLY WORK: 
THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MONEY 
FLOWS 17–19 (2009) (discussing shadow banking and the less regulated areas of finance); Robert 
A. Eisenbeis, Agency Problems and Goal Conflicts in Achieving Financial Stability: The Case of the EMU, 
in THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 232, 235 (David G. Mayes & Geoffrey E. 
Wood eds., 2007) (discussing conflicting state and federal financial regulation); James J. Park, The 
Competing Paradigms of Securities Regulation, 57 DUKE L.J. 625, 665 (2007) (discussing how regula-
tory competition creates regulatory-gamesmanship opportunities for industry players). 
296. See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229 (2010) (“Regulatory arbitrage 
exploits the gap between the economic substance of a transaction and its legal or regulatory 
treatment, taking advantage of the legal system’s intrinsically limited ability to attach formal labels that 
track the economics of transactions with sufficient precision.”); Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives 
and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 227 (1997) (“Regulatory arbitrage consists 
of those financial transactions designed specifically to reduce costs or capture profit opportunities 
created by differential regulations or laws.”). 
297. See Jack Ewing, Global Rules for Banks Draw Near, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2010, at B1 (discussing the 
complexities in creating banking rules and standards across different sovereignties). 
298. See James E. Kelly, Transparency and Bank Supervision, 73 ALB. L. REV. 421, 424 (2010) (highlighting 
regulatory gaps relating to “hedge funds; derivatives markets; off balance sheet entities; the credit 
ratings agencies; firms’ disclosure of risk, valuation, . . . compensation policies; [and] securitized and 
structured products”); Interview by Michael Kirk With Brooksley Born, CFTC Chair 1996–1999 
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the financial crisis in 2008, credit default swaps, a crucial financial product used by 
all major investment banks, were largely unregulated because the industry created 
and situated itself within a regulatory gap.299 
As financial players continue to innovate with little regard for sovereign and 
regulatory borders, lawmakers and regulators must continue to examine whether 
the current jurisdictionally based apparatus is adequate or whether a new paradigm 
is necessary.300  This recommendation for more thoughtful examination is not an 
endorsement of a supercoordinated global regulator that obliterates borders and 
sovereignties because friction-free coordinated governance also contains serious 
risks.301  Rather, this recommendation is a call for thinking anew about harmonizing 
financial regulation that moves beyond traditional spaces bounded by anachronistic 
barriers of jurisdiction. 
On matters of origination, law operates in a structure built on precedent and 
rootedness,302 but cyborg finance operates in a structure built on novelty and 
change.303  Because of this dichotomy, new financial problems and grievances in cy-
fi often lack elegant legal and regulatory solutions and remedies.  Financial regu-
lations often do not organically innovate; instead, they are the children of busts, 
scares, and scandals (and they become orphans in boom times).304  The Great 
  
(Aug. 28, 2009) (PBS television broadcast Oct. 20, 2009), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ 
pages/frontline/warning/interviews/born.html (discussing the lack of attention paid to credit default 
swaps and other derivatives prior to the financial crisis). 
299. Kelly, supra note 298; Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit 
Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1046–47 (2007); Whitehead, supra note 285, at 34. 
300. See, e.g., Choi & Guzman, supra note 15, at 904–08; Fox, supra note 15, at 2501–03; Orin S. Kerr, 
Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1007–
10 (2010); John Seo, Everything Will Be Too Big to Fail, FOREIGN POL’Y, Sept./Oct. 2011, at 74, 
75 (discussing the need for global regulations to prevent financial catastrophes in the future); Bart 
Chilton, Comm’r, Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n, Speech to Goldman Sachs Global 
Commodity Conference: Stopping Stammering: Overcoming Obstacles in Financial Regulatory 
Reform (Mar. 28, 2011), available at http://www.cftc.gov/pressroom/speechestestimony/opachilton- 
43.html (calling for more international harmonization in regulating derivatives). 
301. See Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 323, 326 (2011) (“By 
promoting coordination, regulations and standards can erode key presumptions underlying financial 
risk management, reducing its effectiveness and magnifying the systemic impact of a downturn in 
the financial markets.”). 
302. See Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to 1850, 3 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 28, 28 (1959) (“The modern doctrine of stare decisis as applied in the United States 
is a general policy of all courts to adhere to the ratio decidendi of prior cases decided by the highest 
court in a given jurisdiction . . . .”). 
303. Lawrence Lessig presciently noted in the infancy of cyberspace that this new space contained changing 
features that reject old modes of governance.  See Lawrence Lessig, Foreword, 52 STAN. L. REV. 987, 
990–95 (2000). 
304. See Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence, 75 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 849, 850 (1997) (“[M]ost of the major instances of new securities regulation in the past three 
hundred years of English and American history have come right after crashes.”); Joseph A. Grundfest, 
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Depression gave birth to the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, and the formation of the SEC.305  The Enron and WorldCom scandals 
led to the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.306  The financial crisis of 2008 
spurred the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.307  
Following the Flash Crash in 2010, regulators rushed to create new rules to address 
problems relating to black box trading.308  In 2011, following years without mean-
ingful regulation,309 the SEC finally adopted rules to regulate hedge funds, albeit 
in a limited manner, after their perceived role in the recent financial crisis.310 
As finance continues to innovate, old policies, old laws, and old regulatory 
frameworks will grow more inadequate to govern and protect new investors in the 
age of cy-fi.311  New questions and challenges will arise: Should regulators place 
speed limits and fees on high-frequency trading?312  How should current disclo-
sure requirements adapt to new markets of dark pools driven by Big Data and deep 
secrecy?313  How will laws concerning insider trading and securities fraud account 
for computerized trading platforms dictated by artificial intelligence?314  Does ar-
  
Punctuated Equilibria in the Evolution of United States Securities Regulation, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & 
FIN. 1, 1 (2003) (“[E]very dramatic change in the structure of our securities laws has been provoked 
by a perceived failure in the capital markets that stimulated a regulatory response.”).  For critiques of 
recent crisis-driven financial regulation, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal 
Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779 (2011); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005). 
305. See JACK E. KIGER ET AL., ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 409 (1st rev. ed. 1984). 
306. See Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77, 83, 86 (2004). 
307. SKEEL, supra note 87, at 43–57. 
308. See Speech by Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, SEC: Remarks at the Symposium on Hedge Fund 
Regulation and Current Developments (June 8, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/ 
spch060811tap.htm (remarking on new regulatory proposals following the Flash Crash). 
309. See Whitehead, supra note 285, at 5 (“Although hedge funds grew by 260% between 1999 and 
2004 to become a one trillion dollar business, they were largely exempt from regulation under the 
federal securities and investment advisory laws.”). 
310. See Edward Wyatt, Rule Allows U.S. a Close Look at Big Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2011, at 
B1; Press Release, SEC, SEC Approves Confidential Private Fund Risk Reporting (Oct. 26, 2011), 
http://sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-226.htm. 
311. Regulating cy-fi may require a pathbreaking governing model.  During the infancy of the internet, 
Lawrence Lessig suggested that cyberspace required cyberlaw, a distinct legal field in which techno-
logy itself would serve as a governing apparatus in addition to laws and rules.  See LAWRENCE 
LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 19–20 (1999). 
312. See Nathanial Popper, As U.S. Discusses Limits on High-Speed Trading Other Nations Act, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2012, at B1; Haldane, supra note 14, at 3, 18–19. 
313. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information,” and the SEC 
Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1611–12 (2012) (calling for a new “pure information” 
model of regulated disclosures); Tom C.W. Lin, Executive Trade Secrets, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
911, 919–22 (2012) (describing the current disclosure obligations of public firms). 
314. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231, 
1231–34 (1992) (forecasting legal challenges presented by the emergence of artificial intelligence). 
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tificial intelligence constitute legal personhood?315  How will the mens rea ele-
ment of financial crimes apply when machines act with no mental state?316  Should 
financial fiduciary duties evolve to match the evolution of financial operations?317  
What role should financial regulators play in protecting the financial system from 
cyberthreats?318  Should securities regulation, which has traditionally focused on 
protecting long-term investors, expand to protect short-term investors as well?319  
These and other questions will continue to force law to rethink and reimagine its 
content and purpose in the face of financial innovation.320 
In Aesop’s fable, the tortoise eventually catches up to the hare.  In the race 
between law and finance, the race continues with finance far ahead.  In the fable, 
when the hare was ahead, there were no real consequences.  With finance ahead of 
law, societies have suffered through financial crises costing investors and nation-
states trillions of dollars and through psychological crises of confidence with im-
measurable economic costs.321  Law needs to better situate itself at the intersection 
  
315. See, e.g., Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property in the Era of the Creative Computer Program: Will the 
True Creator Please Stand Up?, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1675, 1686 n.73 (1997) (predicting the legal 
challenges posed by “autonomous and self-aware artificial intelligence”); Solum, supra note 314, at 
1262 (arguing that artificial intelligence cannot constitute legal personhood). 
316. See, e.g., Gabriel Hallevy, “I, Robot—I, Criminal”—When Science Fiction Becomes Reality: Legal 
Liability of AI Robots Committing Criminal Offenses, 22 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 1, 9 (2010) 
(questioning the criminal liability of artificial-intelligence robots); Solum, supra note 314, at 1267 
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John R. Emshwiller, As Federal Crime List Grows, Threshold of Guilt Declines, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 
2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904060604576570801651620000.html 
(opining on the decline of mens rea in federal crimes). 
317. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Imagining the Intangible, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 965, 967 (2009) (proposing 
new corporate fiduciary duties for an information-driven marketplace). 
318. See, e.g., INSA, supra note 225, at 3–4 (proposing a public–private partnership to address cyberthreats); 
Cyber Crime, FBI.GOV, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/cyber (last visited Nov. 26, 2012). 
319. See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,500 (June 29, 2005) (“[W]hen the interests of long-
term investors and short-term traders conflict . . . , the Commission believes that its clear responsibility 
is to uphold the interests of long-term investors.  Indeed, the core concern for the welfare of long-term 
investors . . . was first expressed in the foundation documents of the Exchange Act itself.”). 
320. Some policymakers, scholars, and commentators have already begun to contemplate such questions, 
and the author also plans to address in greater detail these inquiries in future scholarship as these 
questions evolve and ripen with the maturation of cyborg finance.  See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT 
COUNCIL, supra note 224, at 136–37 (acknowledging the regulatory challenges posed by the expan-
sive and growing electronic trading infrastructure); Choi & Guzman, supra note 15, at 904–08; John 
C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. 
L. REV. 707, 707–17 (2009); Fox, supra note 15, at 2501–03; Whitehead, supra note 285, at 6 
(advocating for more flexible financial regulations that break away from outdated “fixed categories, 
intermediaries, business models, or functions”). 
321. See, e.g., ARNUK & SALUZZI, supra note 59, at 1–6 (describing the loss of investor confidence 
associated with the rise of computerized trading); MICHAEL LEWIS, BOOMERANG: TRAVELS IN 
THE NEW THIRD WORLD 1–3, 41–45, 83–87, 133–38 (2011) (discussing the catastrophic impact 
of the 2008 financial crisis on various nations across the world, particularly  Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, and the United States). 
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of technology and finance in order to remain relevant and effective.  As a new in-
vestor emerges, old rules must be reexamined and reimagined for a new financial 
landscape.322  Just as technology and finance adapt and evolve, law “in its eternal 
youth” ultimately must do the same.323 
C. Of Resources and Asymmetries 
Cyborg finance’s reliance on capital-intensive, advanced information tech-
nology is creating huge resource asymmetries between government regulators and 
the regulated industry, and within the industry itself.  Both of these asymmetries 
could have profound effects on finance, law, and beyond. 
1. Between Regulators and the Industry 
The information technology that is at the heart of cy-fi often requires huge 
expenditures, and regulating cy-fi also requires huge expenditures as the industry 
expands, diversifies, and grows more complicated.  While competition for profit 
drives financial firms to invest and innovate in information technology, invest-
ments in government regulators lack similar driving forces and are often plagued 
by political constraints.324  Financial engineers and analysts can make millions of 
dollars in the cyborg finance era.325  Regulators, alternatively, earn a fraction of that 
income.326  Financial firms invest billions of dollars in their operations while finan-
  
322. See Aryeh S. Friedman, Law and the Innovative Process: Preliminary Reflections, 1986 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 1, 2 (theorizing on the impact of technological breakthroughs on legal norms); Moses, supra 
note 284, at 265 (“Rules are devised in a particular technological context, with explicit and implicit 
assumptions as to what is possible. . . . Technological change may render existing rules obsolete or 
less useful for different reasons . . . .”). 
323. See O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 474–75 (1897) (highlighting the nec-
essity of law to adapt itself to novel technology); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The 
Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890) (“Political, social, and economic changes entail 
the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands 
of society.”). 
324. Jesse Eisinger, Greater Power Over Wall Street, Left Unexamined, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May 4, 
2011, 3:12 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/04/more-power-over-wall-street-but-little-
chance-to-discuss-it (“And monetary policy can be in conflict with banking regulation.”). 
325. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO–11–654, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION: EXISTING POST-EMPLOYMENT CONTROLS COULD BE FURTHER 
STRENGTHENED (2011) (studying the revolving door between the SEC and the private sector); 
JAMES Q. WILSON ET AL., AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: INSTITUTIONS & POLICIES 279 (2010) 
(“Every year, hundreds of people leave important jobs in the federal government to take more lucrative 
positions in private industry.”). 
326. While this has traditionally been the case, the compensation gap between those in the industry and 
those regulating the industry has grown exponentially in the last few decades.  Admittedly, there 
exist better compensated financial regulators and monitors, namely private industry and intra-
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cial regulators face limited budgets that continue to stagnate or shrink relative to 
their growing mandates and the dynamic, complex marketplace.327  As a result, a 
large gulf exists between the resources of the industry and its regulators. 
This resource asymmetry between the regulators and the regulated has made 
it extremely difficult for regulators to police key players in cy-fi actively and mean-
ingfully in the face of intense industry lobbying and innovation.328  Resource 
asymmetry between the regulators and the regulated has created significant com-
pensation disparities that make it difficult for government regulators to attract 
and retain talented individuals.329  Additionally, cy-fi’s high speed and high con-
nectivity has also increased its complexity, which has rendered it more challenging 
for regulators to timely monitor and investigate misdeeds with scarce resources.330  
Thus, instead of vigilant prevention, regulators are constrained to limited prose-
cution.331  The end result is a financial marketplace in which significant sectors are 
largely regulated on paper but not in practice, and are prone to cause serious shocks 
  
institution regulators like stock exchange officials, in-house attorneys, risk officers, and compliance 
directors.  Nevertheless, the commentary herein focuses on external, government regulators, who 
serve as arguably the most prominent and consequential regulators of the financial industry.  See supra 
note 325.   
327. See James B. Stewart, As a Watchdog Starves, Wall Street Is Tossed a Bone, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2011, 
at A1 (discussing successful political efforts to reduce the budgets of financial regulators like the 
SEC); Oversight of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s Operations, Activities, Challenges, and 
FY 2012 Budget Request: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. and Gov’t-Sponsored Enters. 
of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 49 (2011) (prepared statement of the SEC), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2011/ts031011directors.htm (“Over the past decade, the SEC 
has faced significant challenges in maintaining a staffing level and budget sufficient to carry out its 
core mission.  The SEC experienced three years of frozen or reduced budgets . . . that forced a 
reduction of 10 percent of the agency’s staff.  Similarly, the agency’s investments in new or enhanced 
IT systems declined about 50 percent . . . .”). 
328. Admittedly, technological advances have improved the regulator’s effectiveness in some respects, 
but, on balance, it has diluted the regulator’s effectiveness as resource disparities allow industry players 
to outmaneuver regulators.  See HENRY KAUFMAN, ON MONEY AND MARKETS: A WALL 
STREET MEMOIR 229 (2000) (“[R]egulatory responses to new financial methods and instruments 
tend to be desultory. . . . Regulators fail[] to grasp the technical complexities of these new tools, instru-
ments, and techniques, or to comprehend their broader significance for the financial system.”); 
Michael Corkery, SEC Chairman Admits: We’re Outgunned by Market Supercomputer, WALL ST. J. 
DEAL J. BLOG (May 11, 2010, 2:38 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/05/11/sec-chairman-
admits-were-outgunned-by-market-supercomputers. 
329. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 325; Edward Wyatt, Study Questions Risk 
of S.E.C. Revolving Door, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2012, at B2. 
330. See Fabozzi et al., supra note 56, at 30 (describing the regulatory challenges of high-speed finance); 
Nathaniel Popper & Ben Protess, To Regulate High-Speed Traders, S.E.C. Turns to One of Them, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2012, at B1. 
331. Despite limited and asymmetric resources, the SEC had a series of high profile victories in 2011 and 
2012 against large investment banks, hedge funds, and other better-resourced participants in the 
financial industry.  See Devin Leonard, Outmanned, Outgunned, and on a Roll, BUS. WK., Apr. 23, 
2012, at 60. 
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to the system.332  Prior to the fallout of the financial crisis, credit default swaps 
and derivatives were largely unregulated by the federal securities and commodities 
regulators despite their paramount importance and relevance to the financial 
markets.333  Many have pointed to the credit default swap and derivatives markets 
in the first decade of the millennium as prime examples of this dynamic in which 
intense lobbying and innovation by the resource-rich, politically connected industry 
players allow them to outmaneuver resource-scarce, politically constrained regula-
tors.334 
The resources between the regulators and the regulated need not be equal, 
but at the same time, the disparity in resources cannot be so large that it renders 
regulators impotent and unable to achieve their mandates.  As previously noted, 
law often plays tortoise to finance’s hare.  However, that comparison may need to 
be amended: Law often plays tortoise to finance’s supersonic, mechanical hare.  
Cyborg finance may have become too fast for old, government centered regulatory 
schemes, especially given the resource disparities.335  As finance continues to inno-
vate, regulators must ask and answer some difficult questions of themselves: Do 
we need a new funding model for regulators in the age of cy-fi?336  Do we need a 
fundamental change in financial regulation that breaks away from old modes of 
top-down, government oriented regulation?337  How these questions are answered 
will have profound effects on finance, law, and society.338 
  
332. Serritella, supra note 73, at 437. 
333. See 7 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2) (2006); Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 299, at 1046–47; Whitehead, supra 
note 285, at 34. 
334. See Fabozzi et al., supra note 56, at 30 (describing the regulatory challenges of high-speed finance); 
Frontline: The Warning (PBS television broadcast Oct. 20, 2009), available at http://www.pbs.org/ 
wgbh/pages/frontline/warning/view. 
335. See, e.g., Serritella, supra note 73, at 439–43 (critiquing the SEC’s initial regulatory response to the 
Flash Crash as “rash”); see also Rodier, supra note 66. 
336. See, e.g., Arthur Levitt, Jr., Don’t Gut the S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2011, at A19 (discussing the 
funding and political constraints on the SEC); Richard Rubin, House Panel Endorses Budget Cuts at 
IRS, Consumer Bureau, BLOOMBERG (June 16, 2011, 12:12 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
2011-06-16/house-panel-endorses-budget-cuts-at-irs-consumer-bureau-1-.html (“[Because of budget 
cuts], the SEC wo[n]’t be able to carry out the new responsibilities it received in the Dodd-Frank law.”). 
337. See Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 
159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 427 (2011) (advocating for more financial self-regulation as a form of new 
governance); see also Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 343–44 (2004) (describing a new governance 
model based on decentralization, localization, and collaboration). 
338. This Article raises these inquiries herein to draw attention to some of the difficult fundamental issues 
that should be considered by policymakers in ongoing and future efforts to craft meaningful regula-
tions for cyborg finance.  The author plans to address in greater depth these inquiries in future schol-
arship. 
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2. Within the Industry 
Cyborg finance has created resource asymmetries, not just between the regu-
lators and the regulated but also among industry players.  Whereas the asymmetry 
between the regulators and the regulated has created a competitive gap in the cur-
rent regulatory framework, the asymmetry within the industry has bred more 
competition within the industry on one level but has also created barriers to com-
petition on another level.339 
On one level, cy-fi has made more investing more efficient and more inex-
pensive for more investors.340  Whereas in eras past, stockbrokers, money manag-
ers, and investment advisors were necessary for many investors, today they are not.  
Technology has made it possible for new players like online brokerages and online 
banks to compete using fewer resources than traditional players.  This has meant 
additional market access and savings for retail investors.  For instance, when the 
NASDAQ instituted the Small Order Execution System (SOES), made possible 
by new technology, it opened up access to NASDAQ execution for smaller inves-
tors who historically did not have direct access to the major stock exchanges.341  
As a result of SOES, “[a]nyone with a few thousand dollars could rent a desk and 
trading terminal that provided a trading platform equivalent to most of the trading 
floors on Wall Street.”342 
Nonetheless, on another level, the resource asymmetries within the industry 
have also created new barriers to competition that have fundamentally changed 
the financial industry.343  The increasing dependence on advanced information 
technology has led to competition for scarce talent and resources that are often cap-
tured by the most successful and most moneyed344: 
  
339. See Duhigg, supra note 76 (describing the “technological arms race” on Wall Street) (quoting Joseph 
M. Mecane, NYSE Euronext). 
340. See Salmon & Stokes, supra note 56 (“For individual investors, trading with algorithms has been a 
boon: Today, they can buy and sell stocks much faster, cheaper, and easier than ever before.”); 
LARRY TABB, TABB GRP., LLC, WRITTEN TESTIMONY TO THE U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE 
ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS 2 (Sept. 20, 2012) (discussing how electronic 
trading creates greater efficiency and lower costs for investors). 
341. BROWN, supra note 59, at 29. 
342. Id. 
343. See Elimination of Flash Order Exception From Rule 602 of Regulation NMS, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-60,684, 74 Fed. Reg. 48,630, 48,633 (proposed Sept. 18, 2009) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. 242.602), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2009/34-60684.pdf (discussing 
the dangers of “two-tiered market[s]” in finance due to resource asymmetries); Jane K. Winn, Catalytic 
Impact of Information Technology on the New International Financial Architecture, 34 INT’L LAW. 137 
(2000). 
344. See PATTERSON, supra note 65, at 230 (“The new hierarchy would be all about who owned the most 
powerful computers, the fastest links between markets, the most sophisticated algorithms—and the 
inside knowledge of how the market’s plumbing was put together.”). 
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The most successful black-box firms all have one thing in common: 
state-of-the-art execution platforms.  Their technology allows them to 
participate in market rallies, to hedge risk in real time, and to capitalize 
on short-term price discrepancies.  Without their technologies prowess, 
they couldn’t stay one step ahead of their peers in the marketplace.345 
Not every firm can afford the best programs, the brightest analysts, and the 
fastest computers.  In 2010, it was estimated that high-frequency transactions in 
the U.S. equity markets were initiated by just 2 percent of the 20,000 trading firms 
in the United States—that is to say, by some 400 firms.346  Many of these firms are 
hedge funds or trading desks of large investment entities with abundant resources 
like Goldman Sachs and BlackRock.347 
Additionally, because speed is an essential ingredient for success in cy-fi, 
better-resourced institutions often possess a significant competitive advantage.  
Firms with more resources, for example, are able to rent expensive real estate at or 
near trading centers so as to reduce the amount of latency in their trade executions 
by fractions of seconds, a process known as colocation.348  Latency refers to the time 
between an order submission and the receipt of an acknowledgement of the order.349  
“It is estimated that for each 100 miles the server is located away from the match-
ing engine, 1 millisecond of delay is added to the transmittal and execution time.”350  
By reducing latency, firms with more resources can consistently execute trades 
faster than their competitors, even if all market players receive actionable infor-
mation at the same time.  As a result of such disparities, the industry is fragmenting, 
and industry participants with fewer resources simply will not be able to compete and 
may choose to withdraw from the marketplace.351 
The fact that some financial players have more resources than others is neither 
new nor revolutionary.  That said, some of the resource disparities in cy-fi may be 
differences not only in degree but in kind—differences that have arguably unpar-
alleled impact on the very function and integrity of the financial system.  Whether 
  
345. BROWN, supra note 59, at 43. 
346. CAROL L. CLARK, FIN. MKTS. GRP., CHI. FED LETTER NO. 272, CONTROLLING RISK IN A 
LIGHTNING-SPEED TRADING ENVIRONMENT (2010), available at http://qa.chicagofed.org/ 
digital_assets/publications/chicago_fed_letter/2010/cflmarch2010_272.pdf. 
347. Fabozzi et al., supra note 56, at 8–9. 
348. See Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-61,358, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 3594, 3610 (proposed Jan. 21, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242); BROWN, supra note 
59, at 63. 
349. See BROWN, supra note 59, at 64. 
350. Fabozzi et al., supra note 56, at 10. 
351. See id. at 29; Matthew Baron et al., The Trading Profits of High Frequency Traders (Nov. 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://conference.nber.org/confer//2012/MMf12/Baron_ 
Brogaard_Kirilenko.pdf  (finding that high-frequency traders profit at the expense of ordinary inves-
tors). 
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these disparities of resources within the financial industry are unfair is subject to 
legitimate debate, but they must be acknowledged and addressed if society values a 
sustainable, successful, and competitive financial industry.352 
V. A DEFENSE OF OUR FUTURE 
Cyborg finance and technological advances in artificial intelligence do not ne-
cessitate the fall of humans in society and finance.  The algorithmically supercharged 
machines that attempt to distill order from chaos and wisdom from data need 
humans more than ever.  In a world in which machines seek to tame the savages of 
randomness with elegant models, humans are nonetheless needed to create those 
models and harvest their true value.  Rather than restrain human advancement, 
technological progress holds the promise of accelerated human progress—in finance 
and beyond. 
A. On Certainty and Randomness 
The speed, precision, accuracy, and convenience of computerized, data-
driven analysis has led many in finance and elsewhere to adore such analysis with its 
elegant models as the antidote to the hostilities of randomness and uncertainty, of 
human action and human folly.353  There exists a certain enchantment with the 
magic of technology and artificial intelligence in finance.  As the noted science 
fiction writer Arthur C. Clarke wrote, “Any sufficiently advanced technology is 
indistinguishable from magic.”354  Magical or not, such adoration is misplaced; 
elegant models do not generate truth, nor do they eliminate randomness from an 
uncertain world.355 
Financial engineers frequently operate by Leonardo da Vinci’s adage that 
“simplicity is the ultimate sophistication”356 as they try to impose the methodologies 
of physics on finance.  Rough edges in data are smoothed away by assumptions 
and generalizations for the sake of elegance and convenience.  Sometimes, when 
improperly acknowledged, these assumptions and generalizations can render a 
  
352. See Fabozzi et al., supra note 56, at 28–29 (debating the market benefits of algorithmic trading). 
353. See EMANUEL DERMAN, MODELS BEHAVING BADLY: WHY CONFUSING ILLUSION WITH 
REALITY CAN LEAD TO DISASTER, ON WALL STREET AND IN LIFE 143–87 (2011). 
354. ARTHUR C. CLARKE, PROFILES OF THE FUTURE 21 n.1 (rev. ed. 1973). 
355. See Paul Krugman, How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 6, 2009, at 36 
(“[E]conomists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in impressive-looking mathematics, for truth.”). 
356. TAL BEN-SHAHAR, HAPPIER: LEARN THE SECRETS TO DAILY JOY AND LASTING 
FULFILLMENT, at xi (2007) (quoting Leonardo da Vinci). 
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model dangerously false.357  In an effort to transpose the rules of the physical world 
onto the financial world, some financial engineers mistook elegance for truth and 
uncertainty for risk.  Risk can be measured in terms of probabilities, but uncertainty 
is immeasurable.358  Finance is not physics despite decades of attempts to trans-
plant the analytical tenets of the physical world to the financial world.359  Forecasting 
the movements of atoms is easy relative to predicting the actions of humans.360  
After losing a large sum of his investments during the South Sea Bubble in 1720, 
Isaac Newtown noted, “I can calculate the motion of heavenly bodies but not the 
madness of people.”361 
Despite the proliferation of data, there exists no dataset so large and no algo-
rithm so refined that it generates consistent, flawless forecasts in an uncertain 
world.362  Likewise, no model can perfectly predict and solve all our problems, fi-
nancial or otherwise.363  Humans can be random, and the world can be unpre-
dictable; therefore, life cannot be perfectly modeled.364  Data of past events help 
forecast future outcomes but not perfectly predict them.  When properly calibrated, 
computer models can be incredibly powerful and instructive tools for decisionmakers 
in finance and beyond.  Even when properly calibrated, however, they are not 
failsafe because randomness remains.365  For instance, while models can have 
high predictive value, they cannot properly account for rare, high-impact events—
so-called black swans—which exhibit the following characteristics: 
First, it is an outlier, as it lies outside the realm of regular expectations, 
because nothing in the past can convincingly point to its possibility.  
Second, it carries an extreme impact (unlike the bird).  Third, in spite of 
  
357. See PAUL SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 4 (1947) (criticizing faulty eco-
nomic models based on oversimplified assumptions that “[t]ake a little bad psychology, add a dash 
of bad philosophy and ethics, and liberal quantities of bad logic”). 
358. Frank Knight, a leader of the highly influential Chicago school of economics, made this distinction 
a central thesis of his landmark book, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit.  See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, 
UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (1921). 
359. See Andrew W. Lo & Mark T. Mueller, Warning: Physics Envy May Be Hazardous to Your Wealth!, 8 
J. INV. MGMT., no. 2, 2010, at 13, 15; JAMES OWEN WEATHERALL, THE PHYSICS OF WALL 
STREET: A BRIEF HISTORY OF PREDICTING THE UNPREDICTABLE 105–29 (2013) (chronicling 
the rise of physics in finance). 
360. Lo & Mueller, supra note 359, at 17. 
361. PATTERSON, supra note 67, at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
362. See Mark Whitehouse, Economists’ Grail: A Post-crash Model, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2010, at A1 
(reporting on the fallacies of financial models in light of the financial crisis of 2008). 
363. Cf. WEATHERALL, supra note 359, at 36–39. 
364. See Lo & Mueller, supra note 359, at 21. 
365. Id. at 14. 
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its outlier status, human nature makes us concoct explanations for its 
occurrence after the fact, making it explainable and predictable.366 
The inability to account perfectly for randomness and black swan events cou-
pled with irrational faith in computer analysis can lead to catastrophic outcomes.367  
The financial crisis of 2008 occurred partially because many financial models 
failed to properly account for a potential (and eventual) steep and steady decline 
in the U.S. housing market.368  During the crisis, investment banks and hedge 
funds suffered catastrophic losses by investing based on their computer models.369  
Most of the prevailing models at that time did not forecast the precipitous and sus-
tained fall of the American housing market.370  Thus, humans should not wholly 
surrender their rationality and free will to imperfect but elegant mathematical 
models, which can be misused and abused.371  Following the crisis, Warren Buffett 
famously warned, “Beware of geeks bearing formulas.”372 
Where does this realization leave investors in the age of cy-fi?  The answer: 
in a better place, if we acknowledge randomness, uncertainty, and our inability to 
perfectly tame them.373  More mindful of the strengths and limitations of our tools 
and of ourselves, we can develop enhanced frameworks for making better and more 
sophisticated financial decisions.374 
  
366. TALEB, supra note 175, at xxii. 
367. See Scott Patterson & Tom Lauricella, Did a Big Bet Help Trigger ‘Black Swan’ Stock Swoon?, WALL 
ST. J., May 10, 2010, at C2 (describing the Flash Crash as a black swan event caused by computerized 
trading). 
368. See, e.g., ANTHONY SAUNDERS & LINDA ALLEN, CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT IN AND OUT 
OF THE FINANCIAL CRISES: NEW APPROACHES TO VALUE AT RISK AND OTHER PARADIGMS 
31 (2010); Amir E. Khandani & Andrew W. Lo, What Happened to the Quants in August 2007?, 5 J. 
INV. MGMT., no. 4, 2007, at 5, 5–9; Krugman, supra note 355 (“There was nothing in the prevailing 
models suggesting the possibility of the kind of collapse that happened last year.”). 
369. See, e.g., Khandani & Lo, supra note 368; Nocera, supra note 168 (chronicling the overreliance on the 
Value at Risk model prior to the 2008 financial crisis). 
370. See Krugman, supra note 355; Nocera, supra note 168 (discussing how a prevailing risk management 
model, Value at Risk, failed during the financial crisis). 
371. See, e.g., Paul Wilmott, The Use, Misuse and Abuse of Mathematics in Finance, 358 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS 
ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON A 63, 63 (2000). 
372. Letter From Warren Buffett, Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., to Shareholders 15 (Feb. 27, 
2009), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2008ltr.pdf. 
373. See, e.g., Krugman, supra note 355 (“[E]conomists need to abandon the neat but wrong solution . . . that 
everyone is rational and markets work perfectly.  The vision that emerges as the profession rethinks its 
foundations may not be all that clear; it certainly won’t be neat; but we can hope that it will have the 
virtue of being at least partly right.”). 
374. See TOBIAS ADRIAN & MARKUS K. BRUNNERMEIER, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF 
REPORT NO. 348, COVAR 1–6 (2011), available at http://www.ny.frb.org/research/staff_ reports/ 
sr348.pdf (proposing a new tool for measuring systemic risk in financial markets); Andrew Lo, The 
Adaptive Markets Hypothesis: Market Efficiency From an Evolutionary Perspective, 30 J. PORTFOLIO 
MGMT. 15, 15–17 (2004) (proposing an alternative model of markets that accounts for uncertainty 
better than the neoclassical model’s based on rational actors and efficient markets); see also ABHIJIT 
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B. On Machines and Humans 
As computers play larger and more pivotal roles in law, finance, and society, 
it naturally raises the question: What is the role of humans in a world dominated by 
computers?375 
Computers are cognitively and physically superior to humans in many ways.  
Computers do not suffer from irrational or emotional whims.  Computers possess 
nearly perfect memory and recall.  Computers process large amounts of data faster 
and more accurately than humans.  Computers do not tire from work or require rest 
the way humans do.  As a result, businesses are relying more and more on comput-
ers.376 
The advantages of computers over the human brain—of artificial intelligence 
over human intelligence—extend beyond the mechanical and rote to the subjective 
and judgmental.377  Computers aid movie studios in selecting scripts at a fraction of 
the cost and at many times the speed and box office success of humans.378  Comput-
ers are used to read and grade student essays.379  Computers have bested legal experts 
in predicting Supreme Court decisions.380  Computers are superior to humans in 
conducting certain types of legal document review.381  Today, we even use comput-
ers to spot lies.382  Oliver Wendell Holmes may have been partly right when he 
wrote decades ago that “[f]or the rational study of the law the black-letter man may 
be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the 
  
V. BANERJEE & ESTHER DUFLO, POOR ECONOMICS: A RADICAL RETHINKING OF THE 
WAY TO FIGHT GLOBAL POVERTY 1–16 (2011) (discussing successful applications of behavioral 
economics to solve the challenges in development work with the poor). 
375. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis, Accelerating AI, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 366, 366 (2010) 
(noting the anxiety induced by improvements in artificial intelligence); Lyons, supra note 34, at 28 
(discussing the permanent displacement of human workers by robots and computers). 
376. Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Corporate Cyborgs and Technology Risks, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 573, 
573 (2010). 
377. See, e.g., RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND 
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 141 (1980) (“Human judges make less accurate predic-
tions than formulas do, whether they have more information than is fed into the formula or precisely 
the same amount of information.”). 
378. See Malcolm Gladwell, The Formula, NEW YORKER, Oct. 16, 2006, at 138 (reporting on Epagogix, 
a company that uses software to predict the potential success of movies based on narrative elements 
in screenplays). 
379. See CARR, supra note 24, at 223 (“[In 2009,] Edexcel, the largest educational testing firm in England, 
had announced it was introducing ‘artificial intelligence-based, automated marking of exam essays.’”). 
380. See Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science 
Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1150 (2004). 
381. See Joe Dysart, A New View of Review: Predictive Coding Vows to Cut E-discovery Drudgery, A.B.A. J., 
Oct. 1, 2011, at 26 (discussing how computers using predictive coding software are at least as efficient 
as humans at reviewing legal documents). 
382. See Anne Eisenberg, Software That Listens for Lies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2011, at BU5. 
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master of economics.”383  Holmes was only partly right because the man of statis-
tics today is not a man but a machine (or perhaps a cyborg). 
In the face of strong and growing evidence of the cognitive superiority of 
computers over humans, it is perhaps easy to relegate humanity to a secondary role 
in the operations of finance and society.384  However easy, that instinct would be 
misplaced and wrong.385 
In a world driven by data and machines, humans are needed more than ever.  
Humans are needed to make the preliminary decisions on experimentation and 
analysis.386  Humans are needed to attest to the veracity and utility of the data.  
Humans are needed to imagine and create the algorithms, strategies, and programs 
for the machines.387  Humans are needed to analyze and apply the experimental 
findings of the machines.388  Humans are needed to establish the rules and regula-
tions that govern all these interactions.  In short, humans are needed to interact 
with the other humans and the world that they inhabit.  Machines still cannot do 
all that we can do.389  The numbers do not contain all the answers.  “Torture num-
bers, and they’ll confess to anything.”390  Even quantitative traders who rely heavily 
on machines do not dispute the necessity of humans in a world full of machines: 
The first thing that should be made clear is that people, not ma-
chines, are responsible for most of the interesting aspects of quantitative 
trading. . . . Despite this talk of automation and systematization, people 
conduct the research and decide what the strategies will be, people select 
the universe of securities for the system to trade, and people choose what 
  
383. Holmes, supra note 323, at 469. 
384. See LANIER, supra note 41, at 24–30 (lamenting the self-subordination of humans to technology). 
385. This instinct is not unique to modernity, as people of previous eras have expressed similar trepidations 
about new technology and the demise of humanity.  See RICHARD HOLMES, THE AGE OF 
WONDER: HOW THE ROMANTIC GENERATION DISCOVERED THE BEAUTY AND TERROR 
OF SCIENCE 94 (2008). 
386. AYRES, supra note 38, at 124. 
387. See NARANG, supra note 99, at xi; Steve Lohr, Google Schools Its Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2011, 
at WK 4 (“Computers are only as smart as their algorithms—man-made software recipes for calcu-
lation[.]”). 
388. Shvetank Shah et al., Good Data Won’t Guarantee Good Decisions, HARV. BUS. REV., Apr. 2012, at 23. 
389. See BRIAN CHRISTIAN, THE MOST HUMAN HUMAN: WHAT TALKING WITH COMPUTERS 
TEACHES US ABOUT WHAT IT MEANS TO BE ALIVE 5–10 (2011) (discussing the limitations 
of computers to have meaningful communications with humans); CHRISTOPHER STEINER, 
AUTOMATE THIS: HOW ALGORITHMS CAME TO RULE OUR WORLD 5–6 (2012) (opining on 
the need for humans to manage processes run by algorithms); John Markoff, How Many Computers 
to Identify a Cat? 16,000, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2012, at B1 (reporting on efforts to create artificial 
intelligence that can simulate human visual recognition). 
390. NARANG, supra note 99, at 149 (quoting Gregg Easterbrook). 
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data to procure and how to clean those data for use in a systematic 
context, among a great many other things.391 
Human ingenuity is needed to create an infrastructure of checks and balances 
to manage technology meaningfully.392  Artificial intelligence, despite its advances, 
still lacks the awareness, judgment, and sophistication of human intelligence.393  
Human ingenuity in persuasion, culture, spirit, and emotion—in the matters that 
are difficult to capture with data but nonetheless important—are all key ingredients 
that must be accounted for in any successful enterprise, financial or otherwise.394 
The discourse in finance surrounding the choice between machines and hu-
mans echoes the discourse in law surrounding the choice between legal rules and 
legal standards.395  Like machines, legal rules often are appreciated for their clarity, 
precision, and accuracy,396 but they are criticized for their rigidity and occasional 
obtuseness.397  Like humans, legal standards are “often valued for their flexibility 
and their susceptibility to nuanced, context-sensitive interpretation,”398 but they are 
criticized for their uncertainty and amorphousness.399 
The emergence of cyborg finance has reduced many financial decisions to 
an elegant set of rules and mathematical models in which human intervention is 
  
391. Id. at xi. 
392. See, e.g., Nat Durlach et al., Source Separation, Localization, and Comprehension in Humans, Machines, 
and Human–Machine Systems, in SPEECH SEPARATION BY HUMANS AND MACHINES 221, 225 
(Pierre Divenyi ed., 2005) (explaining how humans are needed to monitor and correct errors in 
machine-driven processes); Matwyshyn, supra note 376, at 579 (“[Corporations] sometimes neglect to 
build the internal management infrastructure necessary to use new technologies responsibly . . . ignoring 
or unwittingly assuming significant technology risks that can meaningfully damage corporate assets 
and goodwill.”). 
393. See STEPHEN BAKER, FINAL JEOPARDY: MAN VS. MACHINE AND THE QUEST TO KNOW 
EVERYTHING 148–69 (2011) (discussing the limitations of artificial intelligence). 
394. See AYRES, supra note 38, at 117 (discussing the role of human expertise in a data-driven world); NEIL 
POSTMAN, TECHNOPOLY: THE SURRENDER OF CULTURE TO TECHNOLOGY 71–72 (1993) 
(criticizing the surrender of humanity to technology); Steven Schwartz et al., Clinical Expert Systems 
Versus Linear Models: Do We Really Have to Choose, 34 BEHAV. SCI. 305, 305–10 (1989); see also 
DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 60–72 (1995) (explicating on the importance 
of emotional intelligence in human interactions); Ronald H. Humphrey, The Right Way to Lead With 
Emotional Labor, in AFFECT AND EMOTION: NEW DIRECTIONS IN MANAGEMENT THEORY 
AND RESEARCH 1, 12 (Ronald H. Humphrey ed., 2008) (noting the value of employing emotions in 
leadership roles). 
395. See sources cited supra note 21. 
396. Shiffrin, supra note 21, at 1214 (“Legal rules are usually celebrated for their clarity and certainty.”). 
397. See Sullivan, supra note 21, at 26; Sunstein, supra note 21, at 991–92. 
398. Shiffrin, supra note 21, at 1214. 
399. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 
OR. L. REV. 23, 37–38 (2000); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1175, 1178–79 (1989). 
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unnecessary and often unwelcomed.  But those models are not the end of history400 
for humans because markets populated by humans do not behave perfectly in ac-
cordance with elegant rules and mathematical models.401  Beyond machines and 
rules, humans and standards are needed for progress.  Standards, because of their 
uncertain nature, induce and require human deliberation and judgment.402  And 
such deliberation “promotes moral health and development,”403 which increases the 
likelihood of sound financial decisions as reflective thought balances reflexive ac-
tion.404  Advances in technology must be matched with advances in “technologies 
of the self” for there to be meaningful progress.405  The clarity, precision, and accu-
racy of legal rules and machines must be balanced with the nuance, flexibility, and 
empathy of legal standards and humans.  Thus, that is why law needs both standards 
and rules406 and why finance needs both machines and humans. 
The choice of humans versus machines is a false one because every human is 
a cyborg now.  We are all part human and part machine.  The competition of the 
future is not a competition of humans against machines407 but a competition 
among humans with machines.408  The future of cyborg finance is not about what 
  
400. Francis Fukuyama coined the term “the end of history” to describe the “end point of mankind’s 
ideological evolution” following the triumph of Western democracy at the end of the Cold War.  
See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN, at xi (2006).  Given 
the incredible capacity of machines in finance, it may be easy to think that we, humans, are nearing 
our own “end of history” moment in finance, but such thoughts of our demise are greatly exaggerated. 
401. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 129 (2009) (“The acts of human beings are 
not identical mathematical entities; the individual cannot be eliminated as, in algebraic equations, 
equal quantities on the two sides can be cancelled.”). 
402. See Shiffrin, supra note 21, at 1222. 
403. Id. at 1224. 
404. Cf. Yuval Feldman & Alon Harel, Social Norms, Self-Interest and Ambiguity of Legal Norms: An 
Experimental Analysis of the Rule vs. Standard Dilemma, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 81, 81 (2008) 
(suggesting that legal standards and rules each balance one another to create more optimal decisions).  
But cf. Loran F. Nordgren & Ap Dijksterhuis, The Devil Is in the Deliberation, 36 J. CONSUMER 
RES. 39, 39–46 (2009) (finding that deliberation can lead to inconsistent and suboptimal choices). 
405. See Michael Foucault, Technologies of the Self, in TECHNOLOGIES OF THE SELF: A SEMINAR 
WITH MICHAEL FOUCAULT 16–20 (Luther H. Martin et al. eds., 1988) (referring to methods of 
self-improvement as “technologies of the self”). 
406. See FRANK, supra note 401, at 129 (“The law is not a machine and the judges not machine-tenders.  
There never was and there never will be a body of fixed and predetermined rules alike for all.”). 
407. Popular culture’s often suggests that the critical battles of the future are ones between machines and 
humans.  See, e.g., DANIEL H. WILSON, ROBOPOCALYPSE: A NOVEL (2011); TRANSFORMERS: 
DARK OF THE MOON (Paramount Pictures 2011); TERMINATOR 2: JUDGMENT DAY (Carolco 
Pictures 1991).  Despite these popular suggestions, the true contests of the future will likely be human 
battles with the aid of machines. 
408. See Nikhil Hutheesing, Better Trading Through Science, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 31, 2011, 11:50 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-31/better-trading-through-science.html (“Perhaps one 
day investors and traders will have a biometric contraption connected to their computers.  It could scan 
the prefrontal cortex of the brain, determine testosterone levels and measure sweaty palms in mi-
croseconds before warning you not to make a trade.”). 
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machines can do to humans but about what humans can do with machines.  “Every 
technology is an expression of human will.  Through our tools, we seek to expand 
our power and control over our circumstances—over nature, over time and dis-
tance, over one another.”409  This is true in law, in society, and in finance.  Ulti-
mately, the sensible use of smart machines by smarter humans will hold the key to 
better returns and better futures for investors, and it should be a key objective of 
financial regulators in the coming years.410 
CONCLUSION 
A sea change is happening in finance.  Human endeavors have become 
unmanned endeavors.  Computer analysis and mathematical models have replaced 
human thought and human deliberation.  This Article has been an examination 
of this ongoing sea change—an examination of the pervasive ascension of ma-
chines and its wide-ranging effects on law, society, and finance.  It has revealed 
and addressed regulatory and systemic dangers, challenges, and consequences tied 
to the increasing reliance on computerization and artificial intelligence in finance.  
And with that revelation, this Article has forecasted this ongoing transformation’s 
impact on the future of laws and humans as traditional finance transforms into 
cyborg finance. 
This Article began with an ominous claim about the fall of human investors 
as machines rise, but it ends on a more hopeful note.  In the final analysis, the 
critical contests of the future—in law, society, and finance—are not ones between 
humans and machines but ones among humans with machines.  Machines will aid 
new investors in their financial decisions, but despite all the advanced technology, 
financial tragedies and triumphs will remain the responsibility of humans.411  Smart 
computers, smart programs, and smart algorithms still do not stand a chance against 
stupid human policies.  In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, a blue-ribbon 
commission was formed to study the crisis.  One of its key conclusions was that 
“[t]he crisis was the result of human action and inaction, not of Mother Nature or 
computer models gone haywire.”412  The greatest ally and the greatest enemy of 
  
409. CARR, supra note 24, at 44. 
410. See, e.g., Jenny Strasburg, Computer Trading Takes Human Turn, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2012, at C1 
(reporting on new efforts to better combine human financial analysis with computerized trading 
models). 
411. See NARANG, supra note 99, at xi (stating that quantitative finance “is thoroughly dependent on 
human decision making”); see also CARR, supra note 24, at 3 (“We are too prone to make technological 
instruments the scapegoats for the sins of those who wield them.  The products of modern science 
are not in themselves good or bad; it is the way they are used that determines their value.” (quoting 
David Sarnoff, Speech at the Univ. of Notre Dame (1955)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
412. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 68, at xvii. 
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our financial system and our society is not a machine or a network of machines; it is 
us.  The telos of technology is not to render us useless but to aid us in our progress 
and evolution.413  This is the very nature and “perfection of man.”414  Just as the spear, 
the wheel, and the printing press aided our predecessors in the past,415 the com-
puter, its memory, its speed, and its programs will aid us in the future.  And so we 
must build new constructs—legal, financial, and others—to harness the potential 
of this transformative technology while taming its hostilities.  In the end, this is 
the challenge, the promise, and the hope of the new investor. 
  
413. See, e.g., TURKLE, supra note 33, at 16–17 (describing how technology has become like a “phantom 
limb” for humans); Lisa Guernsey, At Airport Gate, a Cyborg Unplugged, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 
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Augustine)). 
415. See JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES 257 
(1999) (outlining how technology has fueled human evolution and progress); ROGER LEWIN, 
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